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Introduction 
 
The editors of a recent volume on asceticism, Vincent L. Wimbush and Richard Valantasis, 
make the following observation in their introduction (1995: xxv): "So we are left in the late 
twentieth century with a long history of scholarly exploration of asceticism that is as 
frustrating and confusing, as naive and limiting, as it is impressive in scope, productivity, 
diversity, and depth. We are still without a comprehensive theoretical framework for the 
comparative study of asceticism." This short statement expresses as well as any other a 
central problem of the study of asceticism, and of religious studies in general. We find 
asceticism in a variety of different cultures, and there seems to be no [375] end to the 
number of its manifestations. All these manifestations can be studied and compared, but 
what does all this lead to? Wimbush and Valantasis point out that no one among the 
scholars in the field really knows. 
 The contributions collected in the volume edited by these two scholars add to the 
richness of information we already have about asceticism. None of them appear to address 
the problem raised in the introduction head-on, even though there are some articles that 
address theoretical issues (Valantasis; Bushell). 
 The present study is meant to address the question (not addressed in the volume of 
Wimbush and Valantasis) how several million years of Darwinian evolution can have 
produced human beings that are apparently inclined to engage in asceticism and related 
activities. These activities are "counterreproductive", and this constitutes a riddle primarily 
for those who wonder how such a feature could have developed and survived. Already 
Edward O. Wilson, the founder of socio-biology, was aware of this challenge (1978: 169-
193), and made some attempts to show the evolutionary advantages of religion. Socio-
biology's successor, evolutionary psychology, which in its more refined form does not 
                                                
* This article has gone through a number of stages. At different phases of its development it has profited from 
the reactions of the following scholars: Walter Burkert, Richard Gombrich, Axel Michaels. I thank all of them 
for their observations and criticisms, and also for their encouraging remarks: a scholar of humanities 
addressing the issues dealt with in this paper is likely to feel more isolated than ever. It goes without saying 
that the responsibility for the opinions expressed remains entirely my own. 
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claim that all human behaviour can be explained by the presumed survival value it once 
supposedly had, still has a hard time to account for behaviours that reduce or even annul 
reproductive success. One of its more sophisticated representatives, Henry Plotkin, 
formulates the problem in his book Evolution in Mind in the following manner (1997: 101): 
"There is no more stark illustration of the problem [of applying sociobiological theory to 
humans] than the existence of celibate priests. Biologically speaking, these are people of 
very low inclusive fitness, yet culturally they are persons often of high social standing and 
power. It is possible to spin a contorted tale about the evolution of celibacy in a small 
number of people in a social group because their teachings, which have a greater impact 
because of their sexual abstinence, raise the fitness of others, and hence their own inclusive 
fitness since such people will often have genetic relatives in the community. But this is just 
a story and a not very convincing one at that." Plotkin then continues: "The simple point, 
that results in untold complexity, is that our behaviour has at least two causal forces acting 
upon it, and sorting out what influence is coming from where is exceedingly difficult. It is 
the old nature-nurture problem writ large." A few pages later he adds (p. 110): "in the face 
of powerful cultural forces, the influence of inclusive fitness on our behaviour may be so 
reduced as to be undetectable by the gross methods of observation and questionnaire [376] 
studies. This is not a problem confined to obscure and rare practices like celibacy in 
priests." 
 It appears that evolutionary psychologists, or in any case some of them, are ready to 
concede that at least one often recurring aspect of asceticism, celibacy, is a particularly hard 
nut to crack. There is no "gene for celibacy", and the sexual abstinence among otherwise 
respected members of society is to be mainly explained in terms of "nurture". The question 
is whether evolutionary psychologists can get away with this answer. They are certainly 
right in pointing out that the cultural background of the ascetics must play an important role 
in explaining their behaviour. However, if it is true that asceticism, including celibacy, 
occurs in many altogether different cultures, the question has to be addressed why this 
particular feature is so wide-spread. The exclusively cultural approach might perhaps 
explain its presence in any one particular culture, but excludes, by its very nature, a 
generalised explanation that is valid for all cultures in which comparable features are 
attested. Cultural dissemination is no serious candidate for a solution either. In an important 
respect it begs the question. If it is true that otherwise unrelated cultures borrow from each 
other one specific feature, celibacy and asceticism in our case, but nothing else, this in itself 
might be seen as an indication that a universal predisposition selects or at least favours this 
feature. 
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 Outside the limited area of evolutionary psychology, the human sciences do not 
seem to be in a hurry to address these baffling questions. A notable exception is the book 
The Creation of the Sacred by Walter Burkert (1996). Burkert emphasises that religious 
practices and beliefs are too widespread to be left exclusively to students of culture. His 
book concentrates on a number of aspects of religion which, though important and 
undeniably part of what is commonly called religion, are not the ones singled out for study 
here.1 Only a short remark in a subsequent publication (Burkert, 1998) suggests that 
celibacy may be a good example of a "cultural parasite". In general Burkert's work reminds 
us of the fact that religion is hardly a unitary phenomenon, that a large variety of often 
widely differing phenomena are all simultaneously designated by this ambiguous term. We 
can learn [377] from this that it cannot be a useful exercise to try to "explain religion". 
Defining or redefining religion will not help either. On the contrary, we may be well 
advised to drop the concept itself for all but reasons of convenience, and concentrate on sets 
of phenomena that share as clearly defined features as possible. Any such set may happen 
to be a subset of what we commonly call religion, or it may combine "religious" with "non-
religious" phenomena. The same applies to asceticism. It does not matter in the least what 
people traditionally call "asceticism". The phenomena combined under this banner may or 
may not share a common feature. But then again, in order to arrive at any kind of 
explanation at all, we will have to concentrate, not on what people call "asceticism" or 
"religion", but on features that are clear and well-defined to the extent possible. The 
features to be analysed in this study will be those that are presented in at least one tradition 
as belonging to a coherent set of phenomena. 
 
The above reflections show the direction which our inquiry will take. The first question to 
be addressed will be: Is asceticism (including celibacy) wide-spread enough to allow us to 
conclude that it must be looked upon as more than an incidental feature of this or that 
particular culture? The second question, which cannot be separated from the first one, is: Is 
it possible to describe in more precise terms what exactly it is that recurs in different 
cultures? Asceticism and celibacy being notoriously vague terms, we will need to specify 
what we will be talking about. Is there something more specific that expresses itself in, or 
through, many (though not necessarily all) of the behaviours which we collect under these 
two terms? These questions will be addressed in §§ 1 and 2, which deal with some forms of 
                                                
1 A "Review symposium" dedicated to Burkert's book appeared in the journal Method & Theory in the Study 
of Religion (10(1), 1998: Boyer, Braun, Burkert, Dennett, Masuzawa, Phillips); see further in the same journal 
Saler, 1999. 
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ascetic behaviour and their context in two specific cultural areas: classical India and early 
Christianity respectively. These sections will provide us with a set of features that might 
conceivably constitute something like a human universal. The identification of this 
provisional universal will then give rise to the general question what shape innate 
behaviours and ideas, if and when they exist, can be taken to assume; this question will be 
addressed in § 3. § 4 will then proceed to show that evidence from a variety of mainly tribal 
cultures support the idea that certain forms of asceticism and celibacy can indeed be looked 
upon as expressions of an innate predisposition. The problem that will remain concerns the 
adaptive value of that particular universal; this problem will be dealt with in § 5. 
 It will be clear from what precedes that no attempt will be made to collect all, or 
even an important part, of the evidence that may be taken to support the existence of the 
universal presented in this article. Evidence of that nature, I believe, can easily be 
multiplied, by taking other religious movements and cultures into consideration. At this 
point it is however more important, in my opinion, to try to attain clarity as to what a 
universal may look like and what role universals may, and may have to, play in the human 
sciences. The time has also come for the human sciences to stop ignoring what is happening 
in the biological sciences and to face the fact that human beings, whether we like it or not, 
are the result of countless generations of Darwinian selection. 
 While preparing this publication it became clear to me that much of the biological 
and neuroscientific groundwork necessary to carry it to completion had been carried out in 
a remarkable recent book, The Symbolic Species by Terrence Deacon (1997). This book, 
though primarily dealing with "the co-evolution of language and the human brain" (its sub-
title), presents a theoretical analysis of what distinguishes human beings from other animals 
which, beside being highly illuminating and convincing, contains the elements needed to 
make sense of the data from religious history here collected. It will be necessary to repeat 
some of Deacon's arguments in a very condensed manner in later sections. The danger of 
thus distorting Deacon's otherwise eminently coherent and impressive train of reasoning is 
of course great. Readers with a serious interest in the thesis of this article are recommended 
to turn to The Symbolic Species for further clarification on obscure points. 
 
 
§ 1: Asceticism and religious thought in classical India. 
 
 India is famous for its holy men. Tourists who visit sacred places like Benares return 
home with pictures of almost (or fully) naked men with long hair who supposedly dedicate 
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their lives to spiritual practices and may to this purpose engage in difficult and painful 
observances. These same tourists may travel southward and visit Shravana Belgola, where 
they can admire the colossal statue of a naked Jaina ascetic, Båhubali, who is believed to 
have remained standing for such a long time that creepers twine around his legs and arms. 
A journey further south may take them to another famous sculpture, the Descent of the 
Ganges, in Mahabalipuram. A detail of this enormous sculpture shows a cat in an ascetic 
posture — standing on one leg, with its ‘hands’ folded above its head —, clearly in order to 
impress a number of mice, depicted around the cat in a position of veneration.2 This second 
sculpture reminds us, not only that asceticism of this kind was performed in India, but that 
it evoked admiration which could easily be abused. (We may be sure that the admiring mice 
pay with their lives for the veneration they display towards the cat.) Indian ascetics are 
reported to perform acts of endurance without regard for the fact that these may harm them. 
Some look into the sun until blindness results, others hold a hand raised above the head 
until it shrivels up, lifeless. Television documentaries confront us from time to time with 
these and other forms of ascetic behaviour, with the consequence that in the western 
imagination India and asceticism are inseparably linked. 
 This image is not new. Foreign visitors through the ages have been struck by the 
holy men they met in the subcontinent. At least since the campaign of Alexander the Great, 
reports on Indian ascetics have reached the western world. Onesicritus, who was to become 
the pilot of Alexander's fleet, supposedly encountered fifteen holy men, later called 
Gymnosophists, who were standing, sitting or lying in various positions which they 
maintained without moving until nightfall. Only one of them could be bothered to have an 
audience with Alexander.3 This was Calanus, who acquired celebrity by accompanying 
Alexander's army from India to Persia and then burning himself to death on a funeral pyre 
in view of the army. 
 Alexander's empire did not survive the early death of its founder. The next western 
visitor to India parts of whose accounts have survived is Megasthenes, ambassador to India 
around 300 B.C.E. for Seleucus Nicator, ruler of one of the realms into which the empire 
had broken up. Megasthenes distinguishes various kinds of ascetics. Some "have their 
abode in a grove in front of the city within a moderate-sized enclosure. They live in a 
simple style, and lie on beds of rushes or (deer) skins. They abstain from animal food and 
                                                
2 A picture of this detail, unfortunately not as clear as one might wish, figures on the cover of the reprint of 
my book The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India that has come out in 2000 (Motilal Banarsidass, 
Delhi). For a discussion of the story expressed in the sculpture, with references to the original and earlier 
secondary literature, see Roesler, 2000: 469 ff. 
3 Sedlar, 1980: 68. 
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sexual pleasures, ... Death is with them a very frequent subject of discourse. They regard 
this life as, so to speak, the time when the child within the womb becomes mature, and 
death as a birth into a real and happy life for the votaries of philosophy. On this account 
they undergo much discipline as a preparation for death." Others "live in the woods, where 
they subsist on leaves of trees and wild fruits, and wear garments made from the bark of 
trees. They abstain from sexual intercourse and from wine." Others again "are engaged in 
the study of the nature of man. They are simple in their habits, but do not live in the fields. 
Their food consists of rice and barley-meal, which they can always get for the mere asking, 
or receive from those who entertain them as guests in their houses." With regard to all of 
these Megasthenes adds that they "practise fortitude, both by undergoing active toil, and by 
the endurance of pain, so that they remain for a whole day motionless in one fixed 
attitude."4 
 India remained a country famous in the western world for its naked philosophers 
throughout antiquity and the middle ages.5 For eye-witness accounts we next have to turn to 
visitors from China. A number of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims visited the home region of 
their religion during the middle centuries of the first millennium and left accounts of what 
they saw and experienced during these extended journeys. Unlike most other foreign 
visitors, these Chinese pilgrims were primarily interested in Buddhism, and much less in 
the religious practices and beliefs of others. The Buddhist monks they visited lived in 
monasteries and were not particularly given to ascetic practices. Yet one finds the 
occasional remark about non-Buddhist practitioners, like the following one by Hsüan-tsang 
(seventh century): "There are men who ... ‘are content in seclusion’, leading lives of 
continence. These come and go outside of the world, and promenade through life away 
from human affairs. Though they are not moved by honour or reproach, their fame is far 
spread. The rulers treating them with ceremony and respect cannot make them come to 
court. ... Though their family be in affluent circumstances, such men make up their minds 
to be like the vagrants, and get their food by begging as they go about. With them there is 
honour in knowing truth (in having wisdom), and there is no disgrace in being destitute."6 
 Moslem travellers visited India in the centuries that followed. The Persian al-B¥rËn¥, 
who spent a considerable time in India in the eleventh century, recognised the importance 
of asceticism in Indian life; he left us a chapter "On the nature of liberation from the world, 
and on the path leading thereto", as well as an Arabic translation of the classical text of 
                                                
4 McCrindle, 1877: 99-102; Bronkhorst, 1998: 20 f. 
5 Karttunen, 1987. 
6 Watters, 1904-05: 160-161. 
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Yoga, the YogasËtra.7 An acquaintance of al-B¥rËn¥, Gard¥z¥, left us descriptions of various 
kinds of Indian ascetics, one of which reads as follows:8 "There is a group ... from which 
devotees go out to the desert. A large throng accompanies such a man, reciting a prayer and 
encouraging him. Then he parts with them and sits alone in the desert. Birds of prey, such 
as eagles, hawks, falcons, gerfalcons, kites, ospreys, and such like gather round him, while 
he sits quiet. The birds approach him growing bolder and bolder until they peck him with 
their beaks. They pierce his limbs, peck his flesh, and he keeps silent and doesn't resist until 
(the birds) have taken off his flesh and eaten it. He loses his life without making a 
movement." 
 The Arab Ibn Ba††Ë†ah, who passed a number of years in the subcontinent during the 
fourteenth century, describes the miraculous feats ascribed to yogis, some of whom go 
without food or drink for months on end. This traveller himself saw a Moslem who had 
taken instruction from yogis: this man had passed twenty-five days on a specially erected 
platform without drinking or eating. Ibn Ba††Ë†ah adds that these yogis were held in high 
esteem by the local sultan.9 
 The period of Moslem dominance in India was followed by one of increased 
presence of Europeans. Some few examples must, once again, suffice. In the 17th century, 
the Frenchman François Bernier saw ascetics who remained standing seven days and 
nights, without sitting or lying down, leaning against ropes while asleep.10 Tavernier reports 
that some maintain this same position for many years. Others keep their hand above their 
heads until death, being naked and exposed to rain, heat and stinging insects. Thevenot 
reports having seen yogis standing on one leg for several weeks. Sonnerat speaks of people 
taking a vow to remain until death in a particularly disagreeable position, such as keeping 
their fists clenched so that the nails grow through the hands.11 
 
All these reports — and the list is far from complete — confirm that foreigners have always 
seen India, at least in part, as a country in which asceticism flourished. Ascetics attracted 
the attention of visitors for their endurance and for the severity of their practices. Judging 
by the reports of these foreigners, one might be tempted to think that in this respect India 
has not changed much over more than two thousand years of history. 
                                                
7 Al-Biruni, India p. 33 f.; Pines & Gelblum, 1966; 1977; 1983. 
8 Minorsky, 1948: 640. 
9 Ibn Battûta, III: 171 f. 
10 Bernier, 1724: 242. 
11 Schmidt, 1907: 151-157. 
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 A look at the indigenous literary evidence brings to light that there have been major 
developments in Indian asceticism, and that there have always been, and still are today, 
important differences between ascetics. Ascetics differ among themselves in numerous 
ways. Many are members of groups. This may find expression in the way they dress; 
indeed, some wear no clothes at all. The religious beliefs of ascetics may vary, as do the 
reasons why they practice asceticism. Their practices, too, can be very different, ranging 
from gentle meditation to self-inflicted torture (not to mention those who do not practise 
anything in particular). All this implies that it would be misleading to speak of Indian 
asceticism without specification as to what group or current one is talking about. 
 However, there are features that are common to many currents, and the history of 
which can be traced from an early time onward. One of these is particularly striking, and 
has indeed drawn the attention of many visiting foreigners. Recall that Onesicritus was 
struck by the fact that his fifteen holy men would for a long time keep various positions — 
whether standing, sitting or lying — without moving. Megasthenes, too, described the 
Indian ascetics as remaining motionless for a whole day in one fixed position. Ibn Ba††Ë†ah 
was struck by the extended fasts undertaken by yogis, Gard¥z¥ by the way some would have 
themselves be eaten by birds without as much as reacting. Bernier and others witnessed 
ascetics who remained standing for extended periods, without sitting or lying down. What 
all these visitors saw — and which a modern traveller might confirm — can be summarised 
in a few words: the ascetics they witnessed tried to abstain from vital activities, or to remain 
motionless altogether, for long periods of time. 
 Motionlessness is a recurring feature in Indian asceticism. This is not to say that all 
of Indian asceticism can be reduced to the sole concern of reducing or suppressing bodily 
action. But remarkably many Indian ascetics, both past and present, did and do pass at least 
part of their time being immobile, often in specially chosen uncomfortable positions. The 
duration of this motionlessness may vary. Religious literature is full of stories of human or 
divine beings who maintained such positions — e.g. standing on one leg — for thousands 
of years. Most others had to content themselves with less, but we will see that some invited 
death precisely by abstaining from all activity.12 
 It is this extreme form of motionlessness that deserves our attention.13 It manifests 
itself for the first time in extant Indian literature in the religion of the Jainas. This religion is 
associated with a historical teacher who was a contemporary of the Buddha, the founder of 
                                                
12 Cp. Settar, 1989. 
13 Most of the remainder of this section is based on research which has been published separately (e.g. 
Bronkhorst, 1993; 1993a; 1995; 1998; 1998a; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2003). 
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Buddhism. This teacher of Jainism is known by the name of Mahåv¥ra, but he was not, it 
appears, its first teacher. Followers of his predecessor Pårßva are mentioned in the Jaina 
canonical texts, and the Buddhist sources are acquainted with the (minor) points of doctrine 
in which Pårßva differed from Mahåv¥ra. The early Jainas, i.e. both the followers of Pårßva 
and those of Mahåv¥ra, dedicated themselves to forms of asceticism in which 
motionlessness played a particularly important role. The statue of Båhubali, mentioned 
earlier, is eloquent testimony to this interest in motionlessness, even though it dates from 
many centuries after the days of Pårßva and Mahåv¥ra. Equally eloquent are the stories told 
about Mahåv¥ra. One, which has found repeated pictorial expression, depicts the great 
ascetic as being pestered by village people who put spikes in his ears, right through his 
head; Mahåv¥ra, of course, does not react.14 
 We do not depend on sculptures and stories alone. The sacred texts of the Jainas 
depict, sometimes in great detail, how a person who is advanced enough to face death 
through inaction should go about it. They emphasise the need to abstain as far as possible 
from all activity, and many Jainas through the ages have chosen for such a death. Voluntary 
death through fasting has remained popular — if that is the expression to use — in Jainism 
right up to the present day. Shravana Belgola, the hill on which the statue of Båhubali, 
mentioned earlier, is situated, has for many centuries been a centre for such chosen deaths. 
Inscriptions on this hill testify to some one hundred and fifty deaths of this kind during the 
last one thousand five hundred years.15 Recent cases of ritual fasts to death of this kind 
(which the Jainas refuse to characterise as suicides) include that of Íåntisågara in 1955 
(Jaini, 1979: 1), and that of a nun in 1989.16 
 Jainism is not the only religious movement in India in which immobilisation plays 
an important role. We will consider further cases below. Jainism, however, presents us with 
more than a remarkable practice. It also provides a theoretical context in which this practice 
makes sense. Jaina practitioners invite death through motionless asceticism in order to 
escape from the effects of their actions. The theoretical background of this search for 
liberation is the belief that actions have consequences — positive or negative, depending on 
the nature of the action concerned — in a future life. The deeds of a person are responsible 
for a renewed birth after his death, and this in a repetitive cycle that will potentially go on 
for ever. The inspiration behind Jaina religious practice is the hope to escape from this 
ongoing cycle. Clearly good deeds are useless to attain this goal, for they give rise to good 
                                                
14 Cp. Wujastyk, 1984. 
15 Settar, 1989: xxvii. 
16 Dundas, 1992: 156 comments: "the recent interest and excitement elicited by a Sthanakvasi nun who died at 
the ate of eighty-seven after a fast of fifty-one days is testimony to the relative rarity of the religious death." 
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rebirths. In order not to be reborn at all, one has to somehow stop all activity. This is what 
Jaina ascetics tried to do. 
 Even this simple sketch shows that religious practice and religious belief go hand in 
hand in this case. The practice of immobility could thus be interpreted as a response to a 
problem posed by a particular theoretical position, often vaguely referred to as the doctrine 
of karma. It is of course equally possible that the doctrine of karma came to be developed to 
make sense of the ascetic practices. However this may be, we note that practice and theory 
together constitute a coherent whole, the elements of which cannot be separated from each 
other painlessly. 
 It will be clear that Jaina ascetics pushed their convictions to extreme lengths. 
Moreover, they believed that their ascetic practices had a double effect. On the one hand, 
abstaining from actions would call forth no further results; this part is almost tautological, 
given the way they interpreted the doctrine of karma. However, these same Jainas had 
carried out deeds before they had become ascetics, both in their present and in earlier lives. 
Those earlier acts clamoured for retribution and had to be dealt with somehow. Jaina 
doctrine had an easy answer: the suffering evoked by immobilisation destroys whatever 
traces of earlier acts are still present. A correctly executed course of asceticism will 
therefore solve both sides of the problem, allowing the ascetic to reach liberation at the 
moment of his death. He will not be reborn, and never again be part of the cycle of deaths 
and births that keep most other living beings in their grip. 
 The belief in the double efficacy of asceticism is an essential part of early Jainism. 
This is clear from the fact that not only the early Jaina texts themselves explicitly say so; it 
is confirmed by early Buddhist texts which characterise the fundamental beliefs of their 
religious competitors. As an example of such a statement from an early Jaina text consider 
the following: "By being without activity the soul does not bind new karma and destroys 
the karma that was bound before."17 An early Buddhist text ascribes exactly the same point 
of view to the Jainas, in the following words: "As a result of the annihilation of former 
actions by asceticism, and of the non-performing of new actions, there is no further effect in 
the future; as a result of no further effect in the future there is destruction of actions; as a 
result of the destruction of actions there is destruction of suffering; as a result of the 
destruction of suffering there is destruction of sensation; as a result of the destruction of 
sensation all suffering will be exhausted."18 
                                                
17 Uttarajhayaˆa 29.37, cited in Bronkhorst, 1993: 37, 27. 
18 Majjhima Nikåya I.93 l. 2-10. 
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 And yet it is by no means evident that present motionlessness should destroy the 
traces of past acts. Interestingly, another early religious movement, known by the name of 
Ój¥vikism, rejected this notion. Ój¥vikism seems to have split off from Jainism around the 
time of Mahåv¥ra, and one of the reasons for doing so appears to have been precisely this 
issue. For the Ój¥vikas motionlessness had but one effect, viz., that of not producing new 
acts. Traces of earlier acts would not be influenced by it, with as result that even total 
motionlessness would not stop rebirth after death for most people. The Ój¥vikas 
incorporated this idea into a deterministic vision of reality, in which each living being has 
to pass through a pre-determined number of births and states of existence until, after 
countless aeons, all acts have been retributed and no traces of them remain. Motionlessness 
at that point will be the appropriate and inevitable thing to do, just before leaving for good 
the cycle of rebirths.19 
 What has been said about early Jainism applies with equal force to early Ój¥vikism. 
Both were ascetic movements whose attempts to suppress all activity fitted the theoretical 
position they accepted. Belief in the efficacy of acts and the practice of inaction were for 
them two sides of the same coin. 
 It bears repetition that the belief in the doctrine of karma and the practice of 
motionlessness do not always go hand in hand, not even in India. There have been ascetics 
who performed remarkable feats of motionlessness without believing in the efficacy of acts, 
as there have been believers in the doctrine of karma who did not perform, or even approve 
of, asceticism. For the time being, however, we will continue to concentrate on those Indian 
thinkers and practitioners (and they are very numerous) for whom the truth of the doctrine 
of karma is beyond all question. Many of them were not Jainas, but shared with them the 
conviction that motionlessness is an essential part of the way to liberation, even if they do 
not all preach motionlessness until death. Beside restraint of movement in general, many 
texts emphasise the importance of immobilising the mind, or the breath; abstaining from 
food and drink is a particularly wide-spread aspect of the termination of bodily activities. 
All these restraints, in various combinations, are recommended in a large number of early 
Hindu texts.20 
  
In order to evaluate the theoretical implications of the close parallelism between ascetic 
practice and religious conviction in these cases, we have to consider some other responses 
that have been proposed to the problem associated with the doctrine of karma. According to 
                                                
19 Bronkhorst, 2003. 
20 Bronkhorst, 1993: chapter IV. 
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this doctrine, acts lead to retribution, usually in a future life; the non-performance of acts is 
a vital step towards avoiding rebirth. However, other responses than asceticism are 
possible, and some of them may indeed be as old in India as the ascetic response. Common 
to these other responses is the belief that the essential part of human beings, their self or 
soul, is inactive by its very nature. According to an important number of thinkers, the 
knowledge, or realisation, that one's soul, i.e. that what one really is, is not involved in any 
form of activity whatsoever, guarantees that one is not involved in the retribution provoked 
by the acts carried out by one's body and mind. 
 Central to this response is the notion of a soul that is inactive by its very nature. 
Such a notion is almost omnipresent in the religious literature of classical India, and has 
been worked out in detail in the main schools of Brahmanical philosophy. They do not all 
agree on the details, but they do agree on one thing: the soul does not act, it does not do 
anything.  
 This central notion finds its simplest expression in the current of thought commonly 
known as Såµkhya. Såµkhya exists in various forms, and finds expression in a large 
number of texts and movements. In its systematised form it is known as the Såµkhya 
philosophy, a variant of which is adopted in the classical texts on Yoga. Systematised 
Såµkhya, as well as many of its less systematised expressions, divides the world into two 
fundamentally different kinds of entities: those that are active, and those that are not. 
Inactive are the souls of living beings, which are presented as being pure, i.e., motionless, 
consciousness. Everything that can act, that is changeable, falls under the heading Material 
Nature (prak®ti), which covers more than mere matter. Indeed, mental activity, being active, 
does not take place in the soul, but in Material Nature, which therefore includes something 
one might call subtle or mental matter. The notion that consciousness can be still, or rather 
is still by its very nature, is fundamental to this vision of the world. Without this notion, the 
soul would be deprived of consciousness, its one remaining feature (don't forget that the 
soul is and has to be totally inactive), in which case one might seriously question the need 
to postulate the existence of a soul at all. Såµkhya has a great deal to say about the 
structure of Material Nature. On the other hand, the problem how to explain that an inactive 
but conscious soul interacts with Material Nature which is unconscious and active, a 
problem which is inseparable from the fundamental structure of Såµkhya thought, proved 
very difficult, and no solution that gave full satisfaction was ever found. 
 Philosophical Såµkhya postulated the existence of numerous souls — one for each 
living being — beside Material Nature conceived of as single. Since all souls are nothing 
but consciousness, without activity or even memory, and therefore indistinguishable from 
ASCETICISM, RELIGION AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 13 
 
 
each other, there is no real need to postulate so many souls. Theoretically a single soul 
might do for all living beings, and there are indeed variants of Såµkhya where this position 
is taken. We will have more to say about this position in connection with Vedånta, below. 
 An altogether different, and by and large more sophisticated, vision of the world 
was elaborated within the school of philosophy called Vaiße∑ika. Here, too, the fundamental 
notion was that of an inactive soul, but the way it was conceived of was very different from 
that of Såµkhya. The soul — or rather the souls: one for each living being — was thought 
of as a substance, like other substances such as vases and human bodies. Unlike the latter, 
however, each soul was believed to be omnipresent, to fill the universe, and therefore to be 
incapable of movement. Since action in Vaiße∑ika is primarily thought of as movement, the 
soul, being motionless, is inactive by its very (omnipresent) nature. This does not prevent it 
from interacting with the rest of the world. Like other substances, the soul too is thought of 
as having, or being able to have, qualities. These qualities are not, however, the same as the 
qualities that inhere in, say, a vase: colour, smell, etc. The soul has as one of its qualities 
what is called "effort" (prayatna), which can have an effect on the body. This can lead to 
the unexpected situation that the soul, though itself inactive, can be the agent of the 
activities of the body. Vaiße∑ika was careful to specify that mental activity, far from being 
an activity of the soul itself, is nothing beyond the fluctuation of other qualities of the soul, 
which do not affect the soul itself (i.e. the soul without, or abstracted from, its qualities). 
Vaiße∑ika succeeded in this way in offering a solution to the problem that baffled Såµkhya. 
It managed to present a model in which an inactive soul can interact with the rest of the 
world in a way that accounts in a more or less satisfactory manner for the world of our 
experience. Note that Vaiße∑ika was not obliged to postulate, as Såµkhya had been, the 
existence of motionless consciousness. Indeed, the liberated soul as conceived of in 
Vaiße∑ika, i.e. a soul without qualities, was thought of as being unconscious. Liberation, it 
was maintained, resulted in a state of unconsciousness similar to that of a stone. No wonder 
that Vaiße∑ika had some difficulty inspiring enthusiasm among religious-minded people. 
 A third way of dealing with the nature of the soul is most clearly exemplified in the 
currents of thought collectively known by the name Vedånta. Here the soul of each 
individual is believed to be identical with a "world-soul", often designated by the term 
Brahma, and invariably described as immutable (often ak∑ara). This idea already finds 
expression in the early Upani∑ads which are part of Vedic literature. It is variously 
elaborated in the different schools of Vedånta that make their appearance from the second 
half of the first millennium C.E. onward. The best known of these schools is the so-called 
Advaita Vedånta whose most famous representative is Ía∫kara (7th cent.?). His system 
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adds to the identity of individual soul and Brahma the notion that phenomenal reality is not 
real, which of course facilitates the task of showing that the soul and Brahma are by their 
very nature inactive. This is not the place to further explore the various ways in which this 
particular conception of the soul has been embedded in elaborate systems of philosophy. It 
is however interesting and important to note that Vedånta in its multiple forms became the 
most widely accepted philosophy of India, and has to a considerable extent been able to 
dislodge other philosophies (such as Såµkhya and Vaiße∑ika) in the course of the second 
millennium C.E. 
 
The insight that one's real self, one's soul, is different from both body and mind, and never 
acts, is useful, but a practical question may remain. What does the body do once this insight 
is obtained? The Bhagavadg¥tå offers an answer which has found many receptive listeners. 
The Bhagavadg¥tå may very well be the most widely studied and recited text of Hinduism 
these days, and has been so for a long time. This text preaches an attitude of separation of 
soul from body. This is obtained by cultivating non-attachment with regard to the results of 
one's actions. Once non-attachment attained, Material Nature (i.e., body and mind) will act 
according to its own devices, no longer involving the soul. The activity of a person who is 
no longer attached to the results of her deeds, the Bhagavadg¥tå teaches, follows the rules of 
the caste to which she belongs. The warrior Arjuna, to whom this teaching is primarily 
directed, will behave like a warrior and exterminate without qualms the members of his 
family that fight in the opposing army, if only he does not fight in order to win the battle or 
to obtain a kingdom. He must remain aloof, and will in this way remain unsoiled. 
 The direct link between this teaching and the doctrine of karma is, once again, 
undeniable. Deeds bind the soul to unwelcome results as long as the soul is involved in 
those deeds and in the results aimed at. When the soul takes its distance, the material world 
(which includes the body and the mind of the person concerned) may move on, even though 
it may no longer act exactly the way it acted as long as the soul was involved. But the 
activities of a person's body and mind bring no karmic consequences to her soul, if this soul 
has succeeded in dissociating itself from them. 
 
It will be clear from the above that a very important part of Indian religious practice and 
thought presents itself as a set of coherent answers to the problem of karma. Since activity 
leads to undesired consequences, one must either abstain from all activity, or dissociate 
oneself from it, or find out that one's real self is by its very nature inactive. In practice these 
different answers are often combined, so that one may practise asceticism and believe in the 
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unchangeable nature of the self, etc. The situation might have been even clearer, and even 
more coherent, had it not been for the disturbing presence of Buddhism, which for many 
centuries exerted an enormous influence both on non-Buddhist religious practice and 
thought, and in this way muddled the waters considerably. 
 It seems clear that early Buddhism — and this means here first of all the historical 
founder of Buddhism himself — rejected both immobility asceticism and the notion of an 
inactive soul. He rejected both because he did not accept the doctrine of karma in the form 
in which many of his contemporaries accepted it. Early Buddhism accepted the doctrine of 
karma in a different form. Not one's acts, but one's desires and intentions bring about 
karmic consequences. This implies that immobilisation in itself cannot influence the 
process of karmic recompense, nor indeed the notion of an inactive soul. Buddhism 
therefore taught an altogether different path to liberation, essentially a psychological path 
culminating in the destruction of the roots of desire. No asceticism, no insight into the true 
nature of the soul could bring about this destruction. The way taught by the Buddha 
involved a lot of interiorisation, in the form of heightened awareness and meditation, meant 
to prepare the adepts for the crucial mental transformation from which they would emerge 
as "awakened" and liberated persons. 
 The Buddhist path was difficult to practise, and the alternative understanding of the 
doctrine of karma was difficult to grasp. An analysis of Buddhist literature shows that many 
early converts apparently did not find it easy to abandon the doctrine of karma to which 
they were accustomed and in which the deeds rather than the desires of a person play a 
central role. Buddhism allowed some of the foreign practices in, and even developed ideas 
that were not altogether different from the notion of an inactive self which it had rejected. 
Influence in the opposite direction — from Buddhism to other, non-Buddhist, religious 
currents — started later, but became very strong. The result is that a number of practices 
taught in the YogasËtra and other "ascetic" texts have been shown to be borrowings from 
Buddhism, and that "orthodox" Brahminical philosophies such as Vaiße∑ika and Advaita 
Vedånta have been thoroughly influenced by it. 
  
This is not the place to disentangle the various strands of influence that come together in 
the religious texts of classical Brahmanism. It is sufficient to point out that, in spite of the 
entanglement, the features mentioned earlier are still recognisably present. Forms of 
asceticism in which immobilisation plays a central role remain "popular" in India, and 
visions of the self as being inactive by nature have lost none of their appeal. The popularity 
of the Bhagavadg¥tå is well-known. 
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 In the next chapter we will discover that features similar to the ones here identified 
occur elsewhere, too. However, the Indian material connects these features in a way other 
cultures may not. The forms of religious practice studied (asceticism and non-attachment to 
the fruits of one's deeds) as well as the notions about the true nature of the self encountered 
are, in India, responses to one and the same problem situation: the belief in the future 
effects of acts as embodied in the doctrine of karma. The fact that the same features can co-
occur elsewhere in situations where there is no belief corresponding to the doctrine of 
karma might suggest that asceticism and belief in the immutable nature of the self are not 
really responses to the doctrine of karma, not even in India. The doctrine of karma might 
then be a kind of rationalisation, a cultural construct which unites a number of practices and 
beliefs that are not really related. 
 Rather than discarding a potential insight that the Indian material presents us with, it 
will be preferable to take the hint and see whether these phenomena may really be related. 
This does not mean that the modern scholar should accept the doctrine of karma. Various 
related religious phenomena do not call for an explanation in terms of a theory about what 
the world is like, but rather in terms of a shared human predisposition. It is in fact rather 
easy to see that the phenomena under consideration, all of them, can easily be understood as 
expressions of a shared disinclination to identify with body and mind. The ascetic takes the 
decision to abandon his or her body (which, Sanskrit kåyotsarga, is exactly the term used in 
Jainism to refer "to one of the best known of Jain ascetic practices, frequently portrayed in 
art, performed by assuming a motionless position, with arms hanging down without 
touching the sides of one's body"; Dundas, 1992: 148). Followers of the Bhagavadg¥tå do 
the same, with this difference that they are convinced that the body (including the mind), 
when left to its own devices, will behave in a manner which agrees with the caste to which 
they belong. The philosopher, finally, gains the insight that he is different from his body 
and mind. 
 Note that no Indian text that I know of identifies a "disinclination to identify with 
body and mind" as a factor behind the practices and beliefs at stake. Identifying this 
disinclination does not help us to arrive at a better grasp of the self-understanding of Indian 
ascetics and philosophers. Their self-understanding, as I pointed out above, is embodied in 
the doctrine of karma. This does not however mean that there may not be such a 
disinclination. We will see that the assumption that there actually is one is helpful in 
dealing with material from other cultures. 
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§ 2: Some concerns of early Christianity. 
 
The complex of Indian ideas and practices discussed in the preceding section is not unique. 
Christianity, during the early centuries of its existence, took many different forms, some of 
them succeeding each other, others existing side by side. In this richness of currents, 
practices and opinions, something very similar to what we have come to know in India can 
be recognised. 
 Putting chronological considerations for the time being aside, let us first concentrate 
on asceticism, as we did in the case of India. In India we were struck by the theme of 
immobility; Christian asceticism offers numerous examples of the same. Literal immobility 
was practised among Christian ascetics. The Historia Lausiaca reports that the monk 
Adolius would stand all night on the Mount of Olives praying and singing, remaining 
immobile even if it rained or there was frost.21 This same text describes how Macarius of 
Alexandria visited the monks at the monastery of Tabennisi, incognito. Macarius observed 
that during the Lent the monks practised various forms of asceticism. Some would remain 
standing all night, but would sit during the day. Macarius, however, took his stand in a 
corner and stayed there until Easter without kneeling or lying down.22 Elpidius observed a 
rigorous fast for twenty-five years, eating only on Saturdays and Sundays; he would remain 
standing all night.23 Theodore of Sykeon, in spite of a grave injury, is said to have stood 
like an iron statue through a night, continuing in praise to God without sleep.24 A certain 
monk called John, according to the Historia monachorum, spent three full years standing 
under a rock, virtually without sleep, and eating nothing but the Eucharist brought to him 
on Sundays by the priest, until his feet began to rot and exude pus.25 Theodoret, fifth 
century bishop of Cyrrhus, describes various forms of asceticism that were in use in his 
days. Among those who exposed their bodies to the open air, thus enduring the opposite 
conditions of being now frozen stiff by the bitter cold, now scorched by the blazing sun, he 
discerns some subvarieties: some stand continually, while others divide the day between 
sitting and standing. Specific examples are the monk Abraham whose body was subjected 
to such sleeplessness, standing, and fasting that for the longest time he remained 
motionless, not even able to walk; similarly Moses, Antiochus and Antony; and Zebinas, 
                                                
21 Delehaye, 1923: CLXXXII. 
22 Williams, 1985: 87. 
23 Delehaye, 1923: CLXXXII. 
24 Life of Theodore of Sykeon ch. 115; tr. Dawes and Baynes, 1948: 164. 
25 Festugière, 1964: 87. 
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Polychronius, and Damianus.26 The so-called stylites belong in this same category. Simeon, 
the first stylite, stood on a pillar for thirty years. Daniel spent thirty-three years on three 
pillars, at the end of which "his feet had been worn away by inflammation and the gnawing 
of worms".27 
 We have seen that practices like those described above were in India accompanied 
by theoretical developments which stress the immovable nature of the true self. Something 
similar happened in a number of religious currents collectively known (perhaps without 
sufficient justification)28 by the name ‘Gnosticism’. We are particularly interested in those 
Christians who believed that knowledge concerning the true nature of the self, which is 
utterly distinct from the body and even from the mental activities, is the means by which 
salvation is attained. The real self is spirit and identical with God, a divine spark. Numerous 
passages in the Gnostic gospels show that God, and by implication the real self of each 
human being, never acts. 
 God, or the ‘established truth’, is described as ‘immutable, imperturbable, perfect in 
beauty’.29 The light of truth is immutable.30 The Father, who is the root of everything, is 
‘inimitable and immutable’,31 ‘immeasurable and immutable’.32 He is unchanging good, 
characterised by unchanging glory.33 His words are eternal and unchanging.34 He is 
invariable, unchanged, unalterable, unchangeable, ‘with immutability clothing him’, 
unchanging.35 "In an unwavering and immovable way he grasps those who have received 
the restoration while they grasp him."36 The heavenly realm is called the ‘Adamantine 
Land’.37 The Untitled Text from the Bruce Codex applies the epithets ‘immovable’ and 
‘adamantine’ to the Father.38 
 Those who possess the gnosis constitute the ‘immovable race’,39 which is 
‘incorruptible’,40 or ‘immutable’.41 The Dialogue of the Savior exhorts the disciples that 
                                                
26 Williams, 1985: 88-89 with n. 36; Delehaye, 1923: clxxxiii-clxxxiv. 
27 Dawes and Baynes, 1948: 69. 
28 Williams, 1996. 
29 Gospel of Truth, tr. NHL p. 38. 
30 Id., tr. NHL p. 46. 
31 Tripartite Tractate, tr. NHL p. 55. 
32 The Second Treatise of the Great Seth, tr. NHL p. 337. 
33 Eugnostos the Blessed, tr. NHL p. 210, 213. 
34 Discourse on the Eighth and the Ninth, tr. NHL p. 294. 
35 Tripartite Tractate, tr. NHL p. 55-57. 
36 Id., tr. NHL p. 94. 
37 The Hypostasis of the Archons, tr. NHL p. 154; see Layton, 1976. 
38 Williams, 1985: 65. 
39 This term occurs in the Apocryphon of John, the Sophia of Jesus Christ, the Gospel of the Egyptians, the Three 
Steles of Seth, and in Zostrianus. All occurrences have been discussed in Michael Allen Williams's monograph on 
this subject (1985). 
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"we should leave behind our labor and stand in the rest; for he who stands in the rest will 
rest forever." One must weep because of the deeds of the body. The Lord will bring to his 
disciples ‘everything that does not move’, for they are from that place. The text concludes: 
"It behoves whoever has understood the actions to do the [will] of the Father."42 
 "The aeons who really exist dwell in silence. Existence was inactivity ... ."43 The 
Allogenes observes, similarly: "... if you wish to stand, ascend to the Existence, and you 
will find it standing and stilling itself according to the likeness of the One who truly stills 
himself and apprehends all these in silence and effortlessness." ‘Standing’, here as well as 
elsewhere, implies immovability, as has been pointed out by Williams (1985: 35 f., 71 f., 
82 f.). The same text admonishes: "... when you become perfect in that place, still 
yourself." And again: "... [do not] further dissipate yourself, [so that] you may be able to 
stand, and do not desire to be [eternal] lest you fall [in any way] from the inactivity in you 
of the Unknown One." "Cease hindering the inactivity that exists in you ..." Stillness and 
silence are often used in this text as attributes of God. ‘Nothing activates him in accordance 
with the Unity that is at rest’; he ‘stands continually’, is ‘the One who is at rest’ possessing 
stillness within himself.44 
 The emphasis on the immovability and stillness of the soul, and of God with whom 
the soul is identical in essence, is all the more noteworthy since these views on the self and 
on God are often incorporated into an elaborate system of mythology. Mythology needs 
‘actors’, not ‘non-actors’. The unavoidable result is that the myths do not always seem 
consistent, and occasionally seem to contradict themselves. This was no doubt the price 
that had to be paid for the attempt to keep the main actors ‘immovable’. This in its turn was 
apparently too essential and central a feature of Gnostic thought to be dropped. 
 
 Gnosticism and Christian asceticism do not date from the same time. The ascetic 
practices which we considered above have been recorded from the fourth century onward. 
We know that the young Antony started living in the desert around 275 C.E., and the Vita 
Antonii (3) records that he was inspired by an old man who had been a hermit since youth. 
But this is the earliest information concerning Christian ascetics we possess. Gnosticism, 
on the other hand, flourished already in the second and third centuries C.E., and perhaps 
earlier. 
                                                                                                                                               
40 Gospel of the Egyptians, tr. NHL p. 199, 200, 202, 203, 205. 
41 Id., tr. NHL p. 204-05. 
42 NHL p. 230, 231, 233, 238. 
43 Zostrianus, tr. NHL p. 391. 
44 Allogenes, tr. NHL p. 449-452. 
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 The cult of martyrdom can be looked upon as a predecessor of asceticism that is to a 
considerable extent contemporaneous with Gnosticism. The ideal of martyrdom plays a 
major role already in the books of the New Testament, and in the Christian writings of the 
immediately ensuing period. Martyrs are no mere victims of religious persecution. In fact, 
they are no victims at all. The ideal martyr is a victor who, in spite of being subjected to the 
most atrocious tortures, remains courageous and does not flinch. Like ascetics, martyrs 
prove that they are in control of their senses in the most extreme of circumstances. Like 
ascetics, they do not give in even when they are free to do so. It is indeed a characteristic of 
the ideal martyr that they be given one or several chances to avoid their sufferings. The 
ideal martyr is until the end encouraged by his torturers to abandon his or her Christian 
convictions, or to just sacrifice for the emperor. 
 Christian martyrdom is already referred to in the New Testament.45 The Christian 
must take up his cross and follow Jesus.46 "There is no man that hath left house, or 
brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the 
gospel's, but he shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and 
sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come 
eternal life." (Mark 10.29-30). "Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute 
you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice, and be 
exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the profits which 
were before you." (Matthew 5.11-12). The disciples are continuously warned in the 
Gospels that they will be persecuted for Jesus' sake.47 When the apostles faced their first 
difficulties with the ruling powers, they rejoiced "that they were counted worthy to suffer 
shame for his name" (Acts 5.41). Soon Stephen was to be the first martyr who followed the 
fate of his master by being stoned to death (Acts 7.54-60). 
 For our present purposes it is interesting to turn to the Acts of the Martyrs, where 
the essential features of martyrdom are clearly depicted. The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp 
describes the nobility and courage of the martyrs in Smyrna:48 
 
"Who indeed would not admire the martyrs' nobility, their courage, their love of the 
Master? For even when they were torn by whips until the very structure of their 
bodies was laid bare down to the inner veins and arteries, they endured it, making 
even the bystanders weep for pity. Some indeed attained to such courage that they 
                                                
45 See Baumeister, 1980: 66 f.; Frend, 1967: 58 f. 
46 Mark 8.34; Luke 14.27; Matthew 10.38. 
47 Mark 13.9-13; Matthew 24.9-13; Luke 21.12-19; John 15.18-21. 
48 For the following passages, see Musurillo, 1972: 3, 13, 25, 27, 47, 53, 67, 69, 107 f. 
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would utter not a sound or a cry, showing to all of us that in the hour of their 
torment these noblest of Christ's witnesses were not present in the flesh, or rather 
that the Lord was there holding converse with them." 
 
Polycarp himself, when about to be nailed to the equipment on which he will be burned 
alive, asks his torturers not to do so, "For He who has given me the strength to endure the 
flames will grant me the strength to remain without flinching in the fire even without the 
firmness you will give me by using nails." Carpus, in the Martyrdom of Saints Carpus, 
Papylus, and Agathonicê (Greek recension), while being hung up and scraped, kept 
screaming ‘I am a Christian’ until he grew exhausted and was no longer able to speak. 
Papylus, passing through the same ordeal, did not utter a sound. Both then were burnt alive, 
praying and smiling. The martyr Justin expects to ascend to heaven after being scourged 
and beheaded, if  he endures. An extreme example of endurance is Blandina who, during 
the persecution in Lyons, received refreshment and rest, and acquired insensibility to her 
present pain on account of her admission ‘I am a Christian; we do nothing to be ashamed 
of’; this in spite of the fact that her torturers admitted that they were beaten, that there was 
nothing further they could do to her, after having tortured her in every way from dawn to 
dusk. Sanctus, similarly, resisted his torturers with such determination that he would not 
even tell them his own name, his race, or the city he was from, whether he was a slave or a 
freedman. To all of their questions he answered in Latin ‘I am a Christian!’ He maintained 
his firmness even though his body was stretched and distorted out of any recognisably 
human shape; and again when the same tortures were applied to his swollen and inflamed 
limbs some days later. Perpetua had to be firm against the urgent requests of her father to 
abandon her faith, before she is led to her death in the arena. 
 [The cult of martyrdom was no Christian invention. It had been present for more 
than a century preceding the birth of Christ.49 Clear instances occur in ii Maccabees. 
Chapter 7 deals with the martyrdom of seven brothers and their mother. Refusing to eat 
porc, they are one after the other tortured to death while their brothers and mother are 
forced to watch. None of them can be persuaded to taste the forbidden food, even while the 
torture is in progress. Eleazar in chapter 6 steps freely forward to the instrument of torture, 
refusing even to eat permitted flesh under the pretense that it is porc. The much later iv 
Maccabees announces right at the beginning that the rulership of inspired reason over the 
passions will be investigated. It is from this perspective that the same cases of martyrdom 
                                                
49 See Baumeister, 1980: 6 f.; Frend, 1967: 22 f.; van Henten, 1989. 
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as in ii Maccabees are here told. This same attitude towards death for the sake of religion 
became part of the Jewish tradition, as is clear, for example, from the works of Flavius 
Josephus.50 Perhaps the earliest theology of martyrdom is found in Daniel 11 and 12, dating 
from soon after 168 B.C.E. Suffering on the part of the wise as a result of firmly resisting 
attempts to corrupt them is depicted as purification (11.32-35), which will be followed by 
everlasting life (12.2).] 
 The connection between martyrdom and asceticism did not escape the Christians 
themselves.51 Restraint was considered the preparation of martyrdom. This is clear from the 
Martyrs of Lyons, where the apostates are said to be those who had not exercised 
themselves, while the others had learned to confess their faith. Tertullian is likewise of the 
opinion that he who has killed his flesh is sure to be victorious in the battle of martyrdom. 
A Christian should not remarry; in that way he will be better prepared for persecution and 
firmer in martyrdom. Virginity, widowhood, continence in marriage, along with fasting and 
asceticism, are preparations for martyrdom. Origen observes that beside the perfection of 
martyrdom, obtained in a short time, there is the slow practice of all virtues, and the 
progressive perfection of a man which consists of the perfection of all virtues. Cyprian 
considers virgins the most illustrious among the Christians and admonishes them to live in 
the spirit of the martyrs. Other early Christian authors are of a similar opinion.52  
 There is another interesting parallel between martyrdom in early Christianity and 
asceticism in India and subsequent Christianity. The case in India may be taken as 
example. There insight into the true nature of the soul was seen as an alternative to 
asceticism, even though some considered a combination of the two most desirable. We find 
a similar belief among certain Gnostics, who held that their gnosis made martyrdom 
unnecessary.53 The Testimony of Truth, for example, ridicules those who think that mere 
testimony secures salvation; they fall in the clutches of the authorities. They are "[empty] 
martyrs, since they bear witness only [to] themselves." The true testimony, which leads to 
salvation, is when man knows himself and God who is over the truth.54 Public confession 
and subsequent martyrdom are decried in the Apocalypse of Peter, because it is wrongly 
thought that this makes one pure. The orthodox Christians are accused of oppressing their 
                                                
50 Frend, 1967: 41 f.; Baumeister, 1980: 56 f. 
51 See Viller, 1925; Malone, 1950. 
52 Viller, 1925: 106-108, 110-11, 113 f.; cf. Malone, 1950: 14 f. 
53 This has been discussed by Elaine Pagels in chapter 4 of her book The Gnostic Gospels (1980). 
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brothers, claiming that God has pity on them through martyrdom, since salvation comes 
through it.55 
 This aspect of Gnosticism is confirmed by a number of early orthodox authors. 
Justin the Martyr complains that the Gnostics ‘are neither persecuted nor put to death’. 
Irenaeus tells us that the Gnostic heretics ‘even pour contempt upon the martyrs, and 
vituperate those who are killed on account of confessing the Lord’. Tertullian goes to the 
extent of claiming that Gnosticism exerts its greatest attraction upon weak Christians in 
times of persecution. Ignatius, who joyfully met his fate of being eaten by wild beasts, 
rejects the Gnostic view that Christ was a spiritual being and only appeared to suffer and 
die; in that case martyrdom would be in vain. Hippolytus uses the same argument.56 
 It may not be correct to think that all Gnostics rejected martyrdom. Yet it seems 
likely that martyrdom played the same role vis-à-vis the Gnostic sects as did asceticism vis-
à-vis the notions about the inactive nature of the soul in India. And this is not surprising. 
Voluntary martyrdom and asceticism share some striking features. Both the martyr and the 
ascetic refuse to act on the urges of the body even where these are extreme. In the case of 
martyrs these urges are provoked by outsiders; ascetics often provoke them themselves. 
 Those Gnostics who rejected martyrdom did not for that reason choose for a life of 
ease and comfort. The author of the Testimony of Truth, for example, while rejecting 
martyrdom (see above), speaks out for restraint: "No one knows the God of truth except 
solely the man who will forsake all of the things of the world, having renounced the whole 
place ...; he has subdued desire every [place] within himself." Renunciation of wealth, of 
sexual intercourse and of the world are advocated.57 The Apocalypse of Peter goes to the 
extent of accepting the martyrdom of some.58 
 
When comparing the situation in early Christianity with the one prevailing in classical India 
a number of similarities strike the eye. In both cultural spheres there were individuals — 
whom we may call ascetics or martyrs depending on the circumstances — who were 
determined to face extreme circumstances without reacting to them. In both cultural spheres 
we also find people, often different from the former ones, who are convinced that their 
souls are inactive, immovable. The Gnostic Christians identified their souls with God, who 
is described in terms of immovability. This corresponds to the Indian identification of the 
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soul with Brahma. (The Indian conceptions elaborated in the classical Såµkhya system and 
in the Bhagavadg¥tå appear to have no parallels in early Christianity.) 
 The coexistence of (so-called) Gnosticism and martyrdom/asceticism in early 
Christianity might be looked upon as no more than historical coincidence. Such a position 
is difficult to maintain in the face of the Indian evidence. There asceticism and the belief in 
the inactive nature of the self are clearly related, the intermediate factor being the doctrine 
of karma. In the case of early Christianity, too, one might therefore consider the possibility 
that Gnosticism and martyrdom/asceticism are related to each other, even if there is no 
explicitly formulated doctrine of karma to constitute the link. 
 How can this be explained? Did the early Christians borrow these ideas and 
practices from India, or vice-versa, did the Indians borrow them from the Christians? The 
second of these two possibilities has to be discarded, at least in this form, for purely 
chronological reasons: religions like Jainism existed many centuries before Christianity 
came into being. 
 However, the thesis of borrowing in whatever form is not likely to take us very far.59 
It is conceivable that someone takes over an idea from a distant culture. It is much harder to 
see how such a borrowed idea could become fundamental to an important religious 
movement. (Don't forget, there was no large scale missionary activity of Indians in the 
Roman world, nor of Westerners in India.) It is even more difficult to conceive of the 
transfer of a two-branched system, presumably from India to the Roman world, without the 
intermediate link (the doctrine of karma) coming along. But the most unsatisfactory aspect 
of this thesis is that, even if borrowing did take place, we would still need an explanation 
why such a complex of ideas should be so widely accepted at the other end. 
 In other words, borrowing is unlikely to have played a role. Even if it had, we would 
still be in need of an explanation — another kind of explanation — for the fact that two 
closely similar complexes of ideas are found in two altogether different cultures, separated 
from each other by thousands of kilometres. 
 It has already been suggested that the whole set of practices and ideas in India may 
be expressive of one and the same underlying predisposition, described so far in negative 
terms: the disinclination to identify with body and mind. It will be clear that the same 
formulation can be used to cover the features of early Christianity discussed in this section. 
Both the martyr and the ascetic were determined to let their bodies be their bodies, and the 
Gnostic was in possession of knowledge which confirmed that his real self was indeed 
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altogether different from his body. Both the Indian and the early Christian evidence 
therefore suggest that a common human predisposition expresses itself through their 
various forms of asceticism, martyrdom and wisdom teaching. It is time to have a closer 
look at what we may expect from a "common human predisposition". 
 
 
§ 3: What do innate predispositions look like? 
 
It would be easy to concentrate on the different cultural contexts in classical India and early 
Christianity, and to accumulate data that would "prove" that the similarities presented in the 
preceding sections are no more than superficial, that they are interpreted very differently in 
the two cultures. Any textual scholar worth his salt can drown the similarities pointed out 
above in a flood of reflections, arguments and textual passages that can convince almost 
anyone that it would be rash to make hasty comparisons, and that much more textual study 
will be required before anything in this regard can be said with a minimum of certainty. 
These scholars overlook that their conclusion is already part of their method. It is obvious 
that any human universal — supposing for argument's sake that there are any — will be 
completely overgrown by traits belonging to the specific culture in which it expresses itself. 
The more we concentrate on those cultural traits, the more the universal will, predictably, 
recede into the background. This does not prove that there are no universals, but merely that 
those scholars follow a methodology which excludes a priori that there might be any. 
 It will be useful to make a comparison with language. Languages are infinitely 
diverse, and the more languages one studies, the more differences are likely to appear. It is 
possible to study what language users in different cultures have thought (and think) about 
their language and language in general, but the results, though interesting, may not be of 
much use to the linguist. (An important exception is constituted by the indigenous tradition 
of Sanskrit grammar, which has been able to provide European linguists with new insights.) 
In spite of this great variety, there is a growing consensus among linguists that language has 
an innate component. 
 More will be said about language below. The few remarks so far made allow us 
already to draw some provisional conclusions. If — and for the time being I emphasise if 
— the set of ascetic practices and religious beliefs studied in the preceding sections are 
somehow expressive of one or more general human predispositions, it is not necessarily of 
interest to know what the actors involved thought about this themselves, or how it was 
embedded in the cultural situation to which they belonged. An exclusive emphasis on 
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"understanding in context" might have the effect of obfuscating the universal predisposition 
that expresses itself through the phenomena at stake. This does not exclude that the local 
understanding of these phenomena — such as the Indian conviction discussed above to the 
extent that certain forms of asceticism and beliefs about the inactive nature of the soul are 
inherently related to each other — may occasionally add to our understanding of them. 
 Partly because of the specific cultural situations in which innate predispositions are 
always embedded, they may be difficult to recognise. If it is true, as has been suggested 
above, that the parallel complexes of religious practices and ideas found in India and in 
European antiquity are to be understood in terms of a common innate predisposition, the 
question has to be addressed how such an innate predisposition can be described and 
distinguished from the no doubt numerous accompanying features that reflect the cultural 
situations in which it finds expression. 
 There can be no doubt that human beings are born with a variety of innate 
predispositions. Perhaps the most obvious one is sexuality, which humanity shares with a 
large number of other animals. We will not deal with this particular instinct, but note that it 
can express itself in a great variety of ways. Indeed, the editors of a recent volume on 
sexuality distinguish between sex, which is a natural fact and lies outside history and 
culture, and sexuality, which “refers to the cultural interpretation of the human body’s 
erogenous zones and sexual capacities” (Halperin et al., 1989: 3). It is also important to 
observe that this perhaps most essential of human instincts does not inevitably lead to 
sexual activity; the celibacy of the ascetics studied in this article proves that an important 
number of people tried and try to resist its urges, no doubt with varying degrees of success. 
Here as elsewhere it is important not to identify human predispositions with "fixed 
programmes" which — as Boyer (1998: 91) rightly points out — would be maladaptive. 
 It will not be of much use to compare the universal which we suspect may be linked 
to aspects of religious and ascetic behaviour and thought with sexuality (or sex). Religious 
and ascetic behaviour, unlike sexuality, are confined to human beings, without clear 
parallels in other animal species. Moreover, though many manifestations of what is 
commonly called religion are heavily infused with emotion, the aspects that have attracted 
our attention in the preceding sections are not.60 Both asceticism (of the kind here under 
consideration) and the views about the nature of the self appear to be essentially dissociated 
from emotion, or even ways to conquer it. The emotions to be conquered include, of course, 
sexual emotion. It does not make sense to see in these practices and beliefs the expression 
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of a universal, an "instinct", that has much in common with sexuality, its "enemy". In order 
to make a useful comparison with the propensity that interests us we need another universal 
that is confined to human beings and devoid of strong emotional dimensions. One such 
universal — confined to human beings and devoid of a strong emotional dimension — is 
particularly important and has received a fair amount of attention in recent years, viz. 
language. 
 The idea that language has an innate component has gained many adherents since 
Noam Chomsky published his review of J.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior in 1959. The 
expression "language instinct" is sometimes used, as in the title of Steven Pinker's recent 
book (1994); he traces this usage back to Darwin. One of Chomsky's arguments against the 
behaviourist Skinner, and therefore for the "language instinct" (Chomsky does not use this 
expression), is that many sentences uttered by language users have never been uttered 
before, which excludes the idea of a limited number of learnt responses, as Skinner thought. 
That is to say, the innate component of language is invoked to explain the fact that 
linguistic behaviour is not limited, not confined to the constant repetition of a finite number 
of learnt expressions. 
 Much has been written about the precise nature of this "language instinct". Some 
believe that the "language instinct" is responsible for the Universal Grammar that is 
supposed to underlie all human languages. Others maintain that the innate component of 
language does not rigidly determine the limits of the possible in human languages, but 
embodies preferences — preferred ways of using language. This is the position of Derek 
Bickerton (1981), who has tried to show that "new" languages, primarily Creoles, always 
share certain syntactic features which are not necessarily present in already existing 
languages. In other words, children are pre-programmed to learn languages that obey 
certain syntactic rules, but can adjust to, and therefore learn, languages that do not 
correspond to their inborn expectations. 
 In spite of the almost general agreement about the innate nature of the ability to use 
language, there is no agreement that this ability has been acquired as a result of Darwinian 
selection. Surprisingly, even prominent linguists such as Noam Chomsky and evolutionary 
thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould have suggested otherwise.61 This position has come 
under attack in recent years (e.g. Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 1994; Dennett, 1995: 
384-393), even though critics find it difficult to specify how exactly Darwinian evolution 
could have given rise to language. 
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 Perhaps the most convincing solution to this problem suggested to date comes from 
Terrence Deacon in his book The Symbolic Species (1997). A characteristic feature of 
human language is that words do not merely refer to "their" objects; words also represent 
other words. They are incorporated into individual relationships to all other words of the 
language. This explains that we can learn the meaning of a word merely from other words, 
say when using a dictionary, sometimes without having direct acquaintance with the 
denoted object: we all know the meaning of "angel", but few of us have ever met one. This 
referential relationship between words is what Deacon calls "symbolic reference"; it forms 
a system of higher-order relationships that is to be distinguished from the indexical 
relationship between a word and "its" object. Language acquisition cannot take place 
without symbol learning. The part of the brain primarily linked to symbol construction, 
Deacon argues at length, is the prefrontal cortex. It is the prefrontal cortex that is relatively 
much bigger in human beings than in other animals, including our nearest relatives, the 
apes. The conclusion seems inevitable that there has been co-evolutionary interaction 
between brain and language evolution. Symbol learning, once in use in whatever primitive 
and undeveloped form in our early ancestors, put a premium on brain developments in the 
prefrontal region that would facilitate and enrich this practice. Since the capacity for 
symbol learning, though limited, is feebly present in chimpanzees and bonobos, it is not 
necessary to assume that the brain had to grow before the earliest manifestation of speech 
(or other form of symbol learning) could take place. It is rather the use of speech (in 
whatever form, but based on symbolic reference) that explains the subsequent growth in 
evolution of the relevant parts of the brain. 
 This is no doubt an attractive explanation for the evolutionary development of 
general language ability, yet it says very little about how a specific language instinct, or a 
Universal Grammar, might have come about. In this connection Deacon reminds us that 
languages, far from being unchanging, evolve over time at a rate thousands of times faster 
than genetic evolution in human beings. If therefore linguists are surprised by the capacity 
of children to learn to speak, and postulate that those same children must already, in the 
form of Universal Grammar, have an innate capacity since otherwise they would not be 
able to distil the rules of grammar out of the sentences they get to hear, they overlook a 
crucial fact. In the course of the hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of years that 
humans have used some form of language, language has adjusted to its speakers, generation 
after each new generation. The Universal Grammar that linguists speak about is therefore 
situated, not in the child, but in the language it is learning. It is due to the evolution of 
language, and much less to that of human beings, that the fit between language structure 
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and the expectation of the children who learn it is close. Deacon observes: "Once we 
recognize this evolutionary process as the primary source behind the universality of 
linguistic features, and abandon the assumption that to be universal a feature must be hard-
wired into the brain, it becomes evident that we may have vastly underestimated the range 
and variety of language universals, or near universals." And again: "I think ... we should not 
be surprised by the extent to which even high-level conceptual patterns of linguistic 
representation and discourse share near-universal features in most languages, simply 
because we are all members of the same species, sharing many common perceptual, 
behavioral, and emotional biases." (p. 121) "Language universals," Deacon points out on 
the same page, "are, in this interpretation, only statistical universals, but supported by the 
astronomical statistics of millions of speakers over tens of thousands of years. They are, 
despite their almost epiphenomenal origin, for practical purposes categorically universal." 
 We will have occasion to return to Deacon's ideas when discussing asceticism and 
religion in a later section. Here it is important to point out that Deacon presents a way of 
thinking about universals which does not postulate that they have to be hard-wired into the 
brain. Indeed, he argues that "although our brains and sensorimotor abilities exhibit many 
adaptations for language that together might be called an instinct, grammatical knowledge 
cannot be one of them." (p. 328). Deacon says many extremely interesting things about the 
way the use of language may have had an effect on the evolution of the human brain, but 
little about why there are certain universals of grammar and not others. His following 
statement may come closest to an answer: "the co-evolution of languages with respect to 
human neurological biases may not just be a plausible source for emergent universals of 
grammar, it may be the only plausible source." (p. 340). He pleads against what he calls 
"monolithic innatism" and speaks instead of "an extensive array of perceptual, motor, 
learning, and even emotional predispositions, each of which in some slight way decreases 
the probability of failing at the language game" (p. 350). 
 None of the authors that we have so far considered objects against the idea that there 
is such a thing as a "language instinct" in human beings, but what they say about it is 
progressively less distinct. All agree, as they should, that the existence of a "language 
instinct" does not conflict in any way with the presence of many different languages. The 
particular language any child is going to speak is not determined by its genetic constitution, 
not by its "language instinct," but by the community in which its grows up. Children born 
to Chinese parents but brought up in Britain among English speakers will speak English, 
and vice-versa. This in itself shows that the "language instinct" is not the same kind of thing 
as the instinct by which birds make their nests, or bees perform the dances that inform their 
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co-workers where to find honey. No, the "language instinct" leaves an enormous amount 
undetermined, to begin with the language that a particular child is going to speak. The 
question is to what extent it determines anything at all. As we have seen, some maintain 
that there is such a thing as a Universal Grammar hard-wired in each child, so that no 
human language can deviate from it. Others, among them Bickerton, think of the inborn 
part of language as expressing itself as a preference which will invariably find expression in 
newly created human languages, especially in Creoles, but not necessarily in all existing 
human languages. And finally there is the argument, supported by detailed considerations 
of the way evolution works, that Universal Grammar is not the kind of thing that gets 
anchored in the human mind by genetic assimilation. There may yet be shared features in 
human languages, universals of a kind, but they are statistical universals, determined by the 
fact that languages, in the course of their evolution, adapt to the human beings, i.e. the 
children, that learn them generation after generation. 
 
What we can learn from this brief discussion of another human universal, viz. language, is 
the following. The existence of a universal in no way implies that rigidly identical 
behaviours will necessarily be observed in all human individuals or even in all human 
societies. That is to say, the absence of identical behaviours or of identical ideas by no 
means implies that no universal can be involved. Just as, in order to find the shared features 
of all or most human languages one needs to abstract from often immense surface 
differences (Chinese is very different from English), one may have to abstract from surface 
differences (primarily determined by cultural and social context, we may assume) in order 
to find the universal we are looking for (supposing it exists). And even when these surface 
differences have been peeled away, it is far from certain that something very specific will 
be uncovered. Linguists have long postulated the existence of a Universal Grammar, but we 
have seen that this Universal Grammar, if it exists at all, may be more fluid than has often 
been thought. It seems safer to speak of a set of predispositions or, with Deacon, of 
statistical universals. 
 All this implies that, in order to strengthen the idea that the complexes of asceticism 
and thought dealt with in §§ 1 and 2 are manifestations of a shared predisposition, it is 
possible to look whether sufficiently similar phenomena are current in other cultural areas 
of the world. The absence of such phenomena in one or more regions will not constitute 
proof that no shared predisposition, no human universal of the kind looked for, exists. Nor 
will it be necessary to find in other regions more or less exact replicas of what we came 
across in the Indian subcontinent and the classical Mediterranean world. This may at first 
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sight look rather wishy-washy, and the risk of unrestrained subjectivity in the selection of 
"evidence" is a real one. Yet we have already formulated our universal in a rather precise 
manner as "the disinclination to identify with body and mind"; we can give this formulation 
a more positive twist, by speaking of "the attitude of being different from body and mind". 
Either way we have a sufficiently precise formulation to allow us to test whether material 
corresponding to it occurs in altogether different cultures. The next section will take up this 
task by considering religious and related phenomena that occur in a great number of tribal 
societies. 
 
 
§ 4: A human universal confirmed 
 
The notion that the self is different from body and mind — including both thought and 
volition — is abundantly attested in a number of so-called primitive societies. Different 
kinds of "souls" are often distinguished. One of these, called ‘free-soul’ by researchers, 
though thought to reside in the body, plays no role in the latter's activities. Nor does it play 
a role in ordinary thought-processes. It is free to leave the body (and is therefore sometimes 
designated ‘external soul’), and does this when its owner is asleep or in trance. The 
adventures of this ‘free-soul’ may be remembered as dreams. Religious specialists, such as 
shamans, are often considered capable of sending out this soul on errands such as finding 
back someone else's lost soul. It is essential for a person that their ‘free-soul’ does not stay 
away for too long from their body; if it does the persons concerned are likely to lose their 
senses or even their life. 
 Hans Fischer (1965) designates the most wide-spread form of ‘soul’ in Oceania 
dream-ego (‘Traumego’) (p. 243 f.). The dream-ego leaves the body during sleep and thus 
explains dream experiences. It does however more than this. States of unconsciousness and 
fainting are connected with its departure from the body. This soul is only observed when the 
person concerned is not able to do anything (p. 247). It is clear that this ‘dream-ego’ is what 
we just called, following Hultkrantz, ‘free-soul’. Fischer is of the opinion that the ‘dream-
ego’ is the principle of life and of consciousness, and as such precondition for thought, 
feeling and will. It does not by itself think, feel or will (p. 321, 324). In much of Melanesia 
and Micronesia the word for ‘dream-ego’ also denotes the shadow or reflection. In 
Polynesia, on the other hand, different words are generally used. Fischer arrives on this 
basis at the conclusion that in the whole of Oceania the concept of a ‘spiritual double’ exists 
beside that of the ‘dream-ego’ (p. 255 f., 262 f.). They are respectively the ‘outer’ and the 
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‘inner’ aspects of the same being, for which Fischer deems the designation ‘free soul’ 
appropriate (p. 273). 
 This same type of ‘free-soul’ is found among the Batak, where it is called tondi or 
tendi. Beside this an ‘external double’ is known, which, among the Karo Batak, is closely 
related to the tendi, yet not identical with it. The same concept, but not the ‘external 
double’, is found on Nias, the Batu Islands and the Mentawei Islands.62 
 Many of the peoples of northern Eurasia know a ‘free-soul’, the aspect of man 
which manifests itself outside the body. It can leave the body during sleep and thus explain 
dreams, or during trance in order to communicate with other souls or supernatural beings. 
This soul represents the personal individuality of its owner, and as such can be called his or 
her ‘self’. Yet the question what role this soul plays while its owner is awake is as a rule not 
even asked. It is however assigned different seats in the body by different peoples: the 
(whole) body by the Cheremis and the Votyak; the skull by the Zyryan; the body or the 
head by the Ostyak and the Vogul; etc. The ‘free-soul’ in this area manifests itself outside 
the body in the shape of its owner in reduced size; this is especially the case in eastern 
Siberia. It is small with the Yeniseian, the Goldi, the Buryat, the Yakut, the Yukagir, and 
others. Other manifestations include whirlwinds (Finns of the Baltic, Cheremis), light or fire 
(Zyryan, Koryak), big animals such as bear and reindeer (Eastern Lapps, Yurak Samoyed), 
small winged animals (Mordvin, Cheremis, Votyak, Zyryan, etc.). Most important in the 
present context is that the ‘free-soul’ in northern Eurasia does not take part in the activities 
of the body. This is visibly the case where the activities of the soul take place only when the 
body is motionless, i.e., asleep, unconscious, or in trance, which is most common. The close 
connection of the ‘free-soul’ with the person as a whole is never in doubt, and is 
emphasised by the use of the reflexive pronoun (‘self’) for its designation among the 
western Ostyak. It also happens that a soul acts to some extent independently of the body 
even while the body is engaged otherwise. In this case it is appropriate to speak of a 
‘double’. In Finnish popular belief the ‘free-soul’ can become a double when its owner is 
struck by a particular illness characterised by giddiness, despondency, weakness and the 
like. The illness is cured when the double is returned to its owner by the appropriate 
method. Another double acts as messenger of death, among the Finns as well as among the 
northern Ostyak, the Tremyugan, eastern Ostyak and Vogul. Among the Mordvin it may 
happen that the ‘free-soul’ of an absent husband (or wife) undertakes activities of its own by 
returning to the wife (husband) and troubling her. These independent activities of the ‘free-
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soul’ may become clearer in the light of the belief of the Teleut that the ‘free-soul’ can 
leave the body, after which the owner can still live up to seven or ten years, all the time 
being ill and weak. Absence of ‘free-soul’ is here, as often, associated with illness and 
eventual death. Indeed, shamans are not infrequently called in in order to return a lost 
soul.63 
 In North America, too, the ‘free-soul’ is commonly inactive while in the body, 
although it is sometimes said to keep watch. A Kwakiutl woman declared that "the soul 
never goes to sleep at night, nor in the day. In the day it stays together with us, and keeps 
watch over us. But when night comes, and we go to sleep, then our soul immediately leaves 
us ...". This soul is usually conceived as having the appearance of its owner; so among the 
Eyak, the Kwakiutl, the Koskimo, the Nootka and the Huron. It is often, but not always, 
represented as a shadow (Coyukon, Carrier, Tlingit, Algonquin, etc.). It may appear as light 
or fire (Eskimo, Quinault, Chinook, Naskapi, etc.). The ‘free-soul’ may be very small in 
size, which may be due to shamanic healing procedures. It is small enough to fit in the 
moccasin of the Athapascan Indian, or in a gourd or a tube at the Northwest Coast and 
among the Central Algonquin. The diminutive ‘free-soul’ occasionally takes many shapes. 
Among the Kwakiutl it sometimes is a bird, or ‘a small bloody ball’, or the exact image of a 
person but only as big as a fly. The Gosiute think the soul has the size of a pea. It is not very 
common in North America for the ‘free-soul’ to show itself as a winged being such as a bird 
or a flying insect, yet some, such as the Southern Paiute, conceive of it as a butterfly. It 
reminds the White Knife Shoshoni of a bird. The Huichol identify it as a little white bird, 
the Luiseño as a dove; etc.64 
 The Netsilik and Iglulik Eskimos of North America knew a ‘free-soul’ which was 
thought to be a miniature image of its owner. It could leave the body in trance, dreams and 
sickness; in the case of sickness it had to be restored to the body. Under specific 
circumstances it could permanently reside outside the body; its owner was then considered 
invulnerable. Similar ideas prevailed in other Inuit groups. The ‘free-soul’ was usually 
thought to reside in an internal organ, such as a kidney or the liver, when not outside the 
body during dreams etc.65 
 The Mundas in India recognise a soul called roa, which is the true self; it leaves the 
body to experience dreams. People are no longer directly conscious of their roa as they were 
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in primordial time. The roa is not inactive, but the immediate effects of its activity belong to 
the invisible world. It plays no role in the explanation of trance.66 
 Finally, the Germanic peoples knew a soul — called hugr or hamr — which could 
leave the body and be active during inactive periods of the body.67 
 All these numerous examples from different continents share one important feature. 
They all talk about some kind of entity, a "soul" in the terminology of the scholars who 
have written about it, which is not involved in the activity of body and conscious mind even 
though inseparable from the person. 
 
Situations in which people accept to undergo, or even bring about in themselves, painful 
experiences while trying to remain unaffected, are numerous. I will once again present 
some examples from tribal societies; it will be clear that we enter here a realm of 
phenomena not dissimilar in certain respects to asceticism. As in the case of early Christian 
asceticism, and for the reasons specified above, no attempt will be made to interpret these 
phenomena in their cultural contexts. They are, on the contrary, purposefully extracted from 
them. 
 The following examples are taken from what are commonly known as initiations. 
This is not the place to define this term.68 It is rather my aim to single out some features 
which frequently occur and which are relevant in the present discussion. We shall first 
concentrate on puberty initiations. 
 Proofs of endurance often characterise these initiations. Prohibitions against 
sleeping, drinking and eating are common, as are silence, darkness, and suppression of 
sight. These are obvious attempts to ignore, or overcome, the needs of the body. Not 
infrequently endurance of physical pain is part of the initiation, as when wounds are 
inflicted upon the candidate: circumcision is particularly wide-spread, but cutting off of a 
finger, removing incisors, and other bodily afflictions also occur. Often, even if not 
invariably, these sufferings have to be undergone — and are undergone — with great 
equanimity. Some few examples must suffice to illustrate these well-known facts. 
 A particularly useful source of information about initiations in Australia is A.W. 
Howitt's The Native Tribes of South-East Australia (1904: 509-677). Some parts of the 
descriptions it provides are especially relevant for the theme we are investigating. We read, 
for example, how at one stage of an initiation ceremony of the Yuin tribe, the boys to be 
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initiated are exposed to a fire "fit to roast the boys". They are not, however, allowed to 
move on any account. "The fire is built up only twelve or fourteen paces from the boys, and 
they are kept before it for ten or twelve minutes, or even longer, if they can bear the heat. 
Even if the wind blows it towards them, they must not move of themselves ..." (p. 526). It is 
the duty of certain others present to move the boys away in case and before any harm can 
happen to them. Among the instructions imparted to the boys, "[o]ne of the earliest, if not 
the first, instruction is that the boy must not under any possible circumstances show any 
surprise or fear, and no matter what is said or done to him, he is not by word or deed to 
show that he is conscious of what is going on ..." (p. 531). This in spite of the fact that 
"[t]he ceremonies are intended to impress and terrify the boy in such a manner that the 
lesson may be indelible, and may govern the whole of his future life" (p. 532). The violent 
removal of the left upper incisor constitutes a particularly painful episode, yet Howitt is 
surprised by the stoical indifference shown by one of the boys: "he could not have shown 
less feeling had he been a block of wood" (p. 542). After these and other ordeals, the 
novices had "to go and live by themselves in the bush, on such food as they could catch, 
and which it might be lawful for them to eat" (p. 559). The restrictions imposed are such 
that "the young man during his probation is placed in an artificial state of scarcity of food, 
although perhaps surrounded by plenty" (p. 560). 
 At another initiation ceremony witnessed by Howitt, of the Kurnai, the boys were 
admonished to lye down next to a large fire that was being lit. "They were neither to move 
nor to speak. If one of them wanted anything, he was to signify this ... by chirping like an 
Emu-wren" (p. 623). In case a boy chirped in this manner, an attendant "had first to stoop 
down and ask the boys in the neighbourhood whence the chirp came, ‘Is it you? Is it you?’ 
until he questioned the right one, when an affirmative chirp replied. Then he had to find out 
what the boy wanted, which he could only do by a series of questions, the boys not being 
allowed to speak. Several times he was completely posed; and, after a number of 
ineffectual queries, such as ‘Are you too hot?’ ‘Is there a stick sticking into you?’ ‘Do you 
want to be moved?’ ‘Do you want to drink?’ he had to wait, and scratch his head, in the 
hope of thinking of the right question." (p. 624). 
 The question could be raised whether initiatory trials can really be considered to be 
related to asceticism. Asceticism, as commonly understood, cannot be dissociated from 
religion. Is this to the same extent true of tribal initiations? 
 It must here be recalled that we have abandoned the categories "religion" and 
"asceticism" earlier on in this article, so that we are not interested in the question whether 
something is "really" religious or otherwise. Cases are here presented which exhibit the 
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features we are looking for on the basis of the universal whose existence we have 
provisionally postulated. It is of no particular interest to know whether these features 
characterise phenomena that are commonly called religion or asceticism. 
 It is yet striking to note that these initiations are often the occasion at which the 
initiand acquires secret knowledge about gods and spirits. What is more, the novice 
becomes part of the spiritual realm himself. During the initiation ceremony of the Kurnai, 
just described, secrets are revealed that concern a great Being, called Mungan-ngaua, who, 
having lived initially on earth, left the earth, and ascended to the sky, where he still remains 
(p. 630). Howitt moreover points out, after describing the puberty rites of the Yuin tribe 
(see above), that during these initiatory ceremonies the boys are told about the divine being 
called Daramulun, being warned at the same time never to mention these things to women 
and children. Clay figures of this god are shown during these ceremonies, only to be 
destroyed subsequently. After loosing their incisor, the boys "were led ... to the tree on 
which the figure of Daramulun was cut, and were told of him and his powers, and that he 
lived beyond the sky and watched what the Murring did. When a man died he met him and 
took care of him". 
 
Both in India and in Gnostic Christianity we came across the notion that the inner essence 
of the human being is identical with the highest godhead. This notion, too, is not confined 
to these two cultures. It is true that the ethnographic evidence is not always clear enough to 
come to very definite pronouncements. Often the, or a, soul is said to return to God after 
death, but this does not necessarily imply that the two are identical. It is possible that 
statements concerning the identity of God and soul require a level of sophistication which is 
not normally present in the societies under consideration. Some of the following examples 
may therefore be less clear than others. 
 The soul called yiegh of the Nuer leaves the body at death and returns to God, from 
where it came originally.69 Among the Fuegians of South America, the Supreme Being of 
the Alacaluf is called Xolas. He is the one who makes a soul enter the body of each new-
born child. At the moment of death the soul rejoins Xolas in heaven. Xolas is therefore the 
source and creator of the human souls.70  
 The examples from North America collected by Hultkrantz concern most commonly 
the ‘breath-soul’.71 An Abnaki Indian from Canada made this statement: "In our old religion 
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we believed that the Great Spirit who made all things is in everything, and that with every 
breath of air we drew in the life of the Great Spirit." This statement identifies man's breath 
with the ‘Great Spirit’, and it does more: it tells us that the Great Spirit is ‘in everything’ 
and therefore omnipresent. A different position finds expression in the belief recorded 
among the Lenape, that some of them believe their souls to be in the sun, and only their 
bodies here. The soul is in this case in the creating deity, the sun, and not therefore in the 
body. Yet also beliefs of a highest divinity which contained the whole world within itself 
have been recorded regarding this people. According to the Creek and the Chikasaw, the 
souls of good Indians went after death to a supreme divinity called ‘Master of Breath’ (or 
‘Breath maker’). An ancient myth of the Winnebago concerning the origin of death 
proclaims: "Into your bodies Earth-Maker has placed part of himself. That will return to 
him if you do the proper things." In Oglala shamanistic speculation Wakan Tanka, i.e. ‘the 
Great Mystery’, ‘the Great God’, reveals himself in gods, spirits and demons; he is 
manifoldness and yet unity. All man's souls are wakan; they are included in the Great 
Mystery. "The word Wakan Tanka means all of the wakan beings because they are all as if 
one." 
 The Ashanti peoples of West Africa know several souls, one of them, the kra, being 
"‘the small bit of the Creator that lives in every person's body.’ It returns to the Creator 
when the person dies. It is the Supreme Being that directly gives to a man this spirit or life 
when he is about to be born, and with it the man's destiny."72 The return of the kra to God 
after death is confirmed by other investigators.73 One of the souls of the Yoruba is called 
emi ‘spirit’. "This is regarded as the seat of life. It is the part of man which is closely related 
to the gods. Olorun the Supreme Deity is known as Elemi ‘Owner of spirits’. A man's spirit 
is thus traced to Olorun, and is therefore regarded as the divine element in him."74 Maupoil 
speaks of one of the souls accepted by the peoples of Dahomey, called se. The individual 
se, he observes, is nothing but a small part of the great Se (Mawu), into which it is 
reabsorbed at death.75 The tondi of the Toba-Batak is identical with the High God according 
to P.L. Tobing. A.B. Sinaga (1981: 105) disagrees with this thesis, but admits that "tondi 
‘represents’ God in man who shares it according to the extent of his possibility and 
finitude". 
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These and similar examples make it plausible that notions of god(s) and notions of soul(s) 
are often related to each other. Since a number of cultures tend to depict the soul, or a soul, 
as not being involved in the activities of the body, we may ask whether such a notion of 
gods, and in particular of the supreme being, as inactive is equally common.  
 It is. The remote and inactive nature of the supreme being in a large number of 
societies has been noticed by scholars of religion, and documented in a number of 
publications.76 The only activity that is often assigned to him is the creation of the world, or 
of the living beings. The following examples will, once again, be presented without any 
attempt to understand them in context, precisely because we are looking for manifestations 
of a universal which, in and by itself, is prior to its manifestations in context. 
 The highest being of the Kamba in East Africa, for example, formed the living 
beings the way one cuts something out of wood with an axe. He lives in heaven infinitely 
far away. He is friendly but has no, or virtually no cult.77 This absence of cult is common, 
and finds also expression in the fact that the highest being is but rarely depicted. The Lunda 
of Central Africa even fear death in case they try to depict him.78 The Mayas of Middle 
America had a god called Hunabku, which literally means ‘the only god’. He has created 
the universe, but lives far away, invisible, with no interest in daily matters.79 "The Supreme 
Being [of the Ona (Tierra del Fuego)] is seldom mentioned by his name, Temaukel. ... 
Temaukel existed forever and is omnipotent. He is bodiless and possesses neither a wife nor 
children. Living above the stars, he is rather indifferent to worldly affairs and men's 
doings."80 The supreme deity of the Munda, called Ha®am or Singbonga, is eternal, 
omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent. He created the world and humankind. In 
primordial times he was visible to man, but now he has become invisible to human eyes, 
though not indifferent to the world and to man.81 The Yansi of Zaire had a supreme being 
called Ngwil, who created whatever there is. He did not as a rule interfere in the life of 
man.82 Among the peoples of northern Asia the god of heaven is so high and far away that 
he takes no interest in the actions of individual men. The buga (‘heaven’, ‘world’) of the 
Tungus, for example, knows everything, but does not mix in into the affairs of man, nor 
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does he punish. No images are made of this god.83 The god Puluga of the Andaman 
islanders withdrew himself when man didn't obey his commandments, and is now without 
cult.84 The god Temaukel of the Selknam (Tierra del Fuego) has similarly withdrawn behind 
the stars, and takes no interest in worldly affairs.85  
 Occasionally the non-active highest god is not even considered creator of the world 
and its inhabitants. This is true of the god called Altjira of the Aranda in Central-Australia. 
He is therefore neither loved nor feared by the Aranda. Their only fear is that one day 
heaven, in which this god lives, might collapse and thus kill them.86 Similar views exist 
among the Loritja, also of Central-Australia. The highest god is here called Tukura. Tukura 
lives in heaven, which has existed from all eternity, and was not therefore created. The High 
God Watauinewa of the Yahgan (Tierra del Fuego) is not the Creator of the Universe, but 
only its master. He lives above the heavens, has no body, nor indeed wife or children. He is 
distinctly and eminently set off against and above all other spirits, and does not enter into 
tribal folklore and mythology. He does, however, punish by controlling the weather and by 
causing the deaths of transgressors and of their children.87 Interestingly, the earliest mention 
of the name Watauinaiwa / Watauinaiwön, in Thomas Bridges' dictionary of the Yahgan 
language, explains this term as "the Ancient one, he who does not change."88 It seems that 
the Tehuelches of Patagonia had a High God who was a deus otiosus, who had no cult and 
was not regarded as the creator of the universe. He was rather associated with the dead. 
Regarding the High God in West African religion, O'Connell observes:89 "Most West 
African religions have a high-god who is also a sky-god. But he is often a withdrawn high-
god, a deus otiosus. There is an apparent contradiction between the supremacy of the high-
god and his withdrawal from concern with the world. The attributes assigned to him 
heighten this effect of contradiction. He is said to be at the origin of things, often as a 
creator; he is all-knowing and all-powerful, he introduces order into the chaos of the 
universe, he is the final arbiter of right and wrong ... But in spite of these attributes the high-
god is not usually directly worshipped, he has no priests and no shrines are dedicated to 
him; people may make a token offering to him in every sacrifice but hardly ever do they 
offer a sacrifice exclusively to him." 
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Omniscience is an almost universally attested feature of the highest being.90 It is not usually 
understood to mean that the highest being knows literally everything. He knows what man 
does, even in secret. This kind of ‘all-knowing’ is of course primarily a characteristic of 
man's ‘soul’, also of an ‘inactive soul’, and it can cause no surprise that it was transferred to 
the highest being. An obvious extension of the idea of an all-knowing highest being is that 
of the highest being as a moral agent who may even punish where necessary. 
 
 
§ 5: On the use of a counterproductive universal 
 
The examples given in the preceding section confirm that there is indeed a shared theme in 
a large variety of religious practices and beliefs that do not otherwise have much in 
common. The present section will therefore start from the assumption that there is a 
universal, a shared predisposition, that makes itself noticeable through these cases and, it 
may be added, has an important role to play in accounting for at least an important part of 
ascetic and religious behaviour. For the sake of brevity, and in imitation of the expression 
"language instinct", which has become current today, I will use the equally unsatisfactory 
expression "ascetic instinct" (always to be used in inverted commas). The question as to 
how to account for the presence of such a shared predisposition is inevitable and will be 
addressed in this section. 
 The parallelism between the "language instinct" and the "ascetic instinct" goes 
beyond both having a somewhat inappropriate name. Both are confined to human beings, 
and both regulate (if that is the word to use) the interaction between individual humans and 
pre-existing cultural complexes, viz. language and religion respectively. Both individual 
languages and individual religions evolve, and in doing so will adapt to the predispositions 
of their users. Both are therefore likely to evolve common features, something like 
Universal Grammar in the case of language, something like the features described in the 
preceding sections in the case of religion. In both cases it is to be kept in mind that neither 
individual languages nor individual religions have to conform to the "universal" features 
identified in a number of them. Both times there is statistical probability that these features 
make their appearance as a result of a long process of (cultural) evolution in which other 
factors play a role, too. 
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 There is another factor that puts our "ascetic instinct" on a par with the "language 
instinct" and in a different category from an instinct like sexuality. The features which we 
have united under the designation "ascetic instinct" — primarily asceticism and the 
inclination to see the self as not involved in activity by nature — are not accompanied by 
strong emotions, like language and unlike sexuality. This is not to say that religion cannot 
be accompanied by strong emotions. Indeed, the central role of fear in the transmission of 
many if not most forms of religions is well known,91 as is the role of love and devotion in 
many of them. However, the features that constitute our "ascetic instinct" are different. The 
ascetic and the martyr are not driven by fear, they defy and overcome it. "O death, where is 
thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?," St Paul exclaimed (1 Cor 15: 55), and there can 
be no doubt that his words have inspired countless martyrs and ascetics. Knowledge about 
the true (inactive) nature of the self is not accompanied by fear either. It is, on the contrary, 
the definitive way to separate oneself from fear and other emotions.  
 Language and religion are not in all respects parallel to each other and there are 
important differences between them. New religions may suddenly arise, where no such 
thing normally happens in the case of languages. People may be forced to abandon their 
religion in favour of another one; comparable replacements of one language by another, 
imposed by economic or political necessity, may as a rule be less abrupt. It is possible, even 
likely, that religions interact more strongly than languages with other ambient social and 
cultural developments. All this does not change the fact that by and large language and 
religion, being cultural complexes that individuals normally inherit from their elders and 
that, in doing so, adapt over the generations to the predispositions of their users, behave in 
roughly parallel fashion. 
 Since cultural complexes, such as language and religion, are subject to evolution in 
a way that is not dissimilar to genetic evolution, sometimes the notion of "memes" 
(corresponding to genes in biological evolution) is used to designate the cultural units that 
pass on from one generation to the next and may be modified in the process. A religion, 
being a complex that unites a number of memes, is then a "memeplex". In spite of the 
enormous differences — a gene can be chemically identified, the very nature of a meme is 
difficult to determine; memes essentially depend on the presence of human minds, genes 
don't; etc. — the evolution of memeplexes can be studied in more or less the same way as 
that of organisms. Religions being memeplexes, they evolve in such a manner that religions 
containing successful memes have better chances to survive. The most enthusiastic users of 
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the notion of memes (e.g. Susan Blackmore, 1999: chapter 15) think that memetic evolution 
may account for behaviours that are genetically disadvantageous, or even that memes can 
influence genetic evolution. 
 Theoretically it may be possible that the presence of certain cultural complexes 
influences genetic evolution. Indeed, we have seen that Deacon explains the enormous 
development of the human brain as a consequence of the crossing of the "symbolic 
threshold" and the resulting use of language. Genetic evolution could in this case be 
influenced, even determined, by a cultural change, since the new cultural situation (the use 
of language) came to accompany our ancestors for such a long time that genetic 
modifications influenced by it became possible. Language could become a permanent 
feature of early humans because it greatly augments the chances of survival of those who 
use it. Cultural features that do not have that effect, on the other hand, will not normally 
stay around for long enough to become hard-wired in the neural system. This is the reason 
why Deacon argues against the innate nature of Universal Grammar. 
 Those who look upon religion as a "memeplex" that may have had an effect on 
genetic evolution will have to make clear in what way and to what extent religion increases 
the survival chances of those who are religious. They will next have to specify what 
particular invariant aspect of religion has stayed around long enough to make a transfer into 
the genetic constitution of human beings not only possible but advantageous. Claims of this 
nature are for the time being highly implausible or at best totally speculative, so that we 
will not pursue this path here. 
 It is more promising to recall that the "memetic" evolution of religion will tend to 
adapt religion to the inborn predispositions of the humans who inherit the religion 
concerned, that memes will be "parasitically exploiting proclivities they have ‘discovered’ 
in the human cognitive-immune system" (Dennett, 1998: 120). That is to say, it is the 
religion that adjusts itself to the human being, and there is little or no question of human 
beings genetically adjusting to their religion. If, as is being argued in this article, a 
significant number of religions share the feature studied and specified in the preceding 
pages, this is because human beings have a predisposition that corresponds to this feature, 
and this independently of their particular religions. The "ascetic instinct" has not been 
created by religion but, on the contrary, has played and still plays a role in the formation 
and replication of existing religions. 
 So far the situation is not very different from the one prevailing in language 
formation. Universal Grammar, Deacon argues, is statistically often present in languages 
because of the presence of certain predispositions in human beings (the "language instinct") 
ASCETICISM, RELIGION AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 43 
 
 
that favour its appearance. Similarly, asceticism and the other features dealt with in this 
article often occur in religions on account of the presence in human beings of the "ascetic 
instinct". There is however one important difference. The predispositions that give rise to 
Universal Grammar have no discernible effect on the evolutionary fitness of their bearers. 
The "ascetic instinct", on the other hand, has a clear effect on the evolutionary fitness of its 
bearers, namely a negative one. The "ascetic instinct", as here understood, predisposes to 
asceticism and sexual abstinence, among other things. Such an "instinct" should have been 
weeded out long ago by natural selection. How has it been able to stay with us? 
 We have spoken at some length of the momentous effect that symbolic thinking and 
language use have had on the evolution of modern man. Indeed, symbolic thinking and 
language use are the two features that account for "humanness" more than any other genetic 
or cultural features. It is with their help that human beings can construct ideas of reality that 
are beyond immediate evidence which can then be shared with other language users. 
Shared, but unverifiable, ideas about reality characterise many if not all religions. 
Supernatural entities could hardly have come to occupy a central position in religious 
thought without the use of language or at least symbolic reference. Shared ideas about the 
nature of the self which, as we have seen, recur in a great number of religions, are equally 
dependent upon these two. It seems evident that the appearance of religion has some 
connection with the appearance of symbolic thinking. But what kind of connection? 
  
Symbolic reference (as explained in § 3) goes beyond iconic and indexical reference by 
creating a network of connections between the symbols. To quote Deacon: "My imagistic 
and emotional experience in response to the episodes described in a novel is distinct from 
that of anyone else, though all readers will share a common symbolic understanding of 
them. The ‘subjective distance’ from what is represented confers a representational 
freedom to thought processes that is not afforded by the direct recall or imagining of 
experiences." (p. 451) Deacon then continues (pp. 451-452): 
 
"This is crucial for the development of self-consciousness, and for the sort of 
detachment from immediate arousal and compulsion that allows for self-control. 
Self-representation, in the context of representations of alternative pasts and futures, 
could not be attained without a means for symbolic representation. ... 
 Consciousness of self in this way implicitly includes consciousness of other 
selves, and other consciousnesses can only be represented through the virtual 
reference created by symbols. The self that is the source of one's experience of 
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intentionality, that self that is judged by itself as well as by others for its moral 
choices, the self that worries about its impending departure from the world, this self 
is a symbolic self. It is the final irony that it is the virtual, not actual, reference that 
symbols provide, which gives rise to this experience of self. This most undeniably 
real experience is a virtual reality. 
 In a curious way, this recapitulates an unshakeable intuition that has been 
ubiquitously expressed throughout the ages. This is the belief in a disembodied 
spirit or immortal ‘pilgrim soul’ that defines that part of a person that is not ‘of the 
body’ and is not reducible to the stuff of the material world." 
 
In other words, the very process — the development of symbolic representation — that 
gave rise to language (and the accompanying growth of the prefrontal part of the brain), 
also gave rise to certain "notions", a certain kind of "knowledge" about the world, and in its 
train (or in its place) to a certain "attitude", which express themselves in the phenomena 
studied in this paper. A number of these phenomena, especially the tendency to abstain 
from sexuality, are counterproductive from an evolutionary point of view. At first blush 
one might therefore expect that the universal behind it should have been selected against in 
the course of time. But this universal, we now know, does not stand alone. In fact, there is 
no gene (or collection of genes) that is exclusively responsible for this universal. Rather, 
this universal is an accompaniment of symbolic representation. There may be no gene for 
symbolic representation either, but here the situation is somewhat more complicated. 
Symbolic representation and language, both cultural features, have co-evolved with the 
human brain, the evolution of the human brain being a genetic development. The "ascetic 
instinct" is therefore dependent upon symbolic representation, perhaps inseparable from it. 
From an evolutionary point of view, symbolic representation has increased the chances of 
survival (and of procreation) of those capable of it through language; language gave its 
users a decided edge. At the same time, symbolic representation was a handicap, if perhaps 
a relatively small one, because it saddled those capable of it with certain attitudes, perhaps 
ideas, which would lead a small minority from among them to renounce sexuality, or to 
inflict damage to their own bodies. 
 Since we are talking about natural selection, which is a process that may need 
numerous generations to become effective, it is appropriate to point out that the number of 
individual sexual renouncers in pre-historic times may have been very small indeed, if there 
were any at all. The "ascetic instinct" may not, therefore, have exposed itself to selection 
pressure on this level until historic times, which is very recent from an evolutionary 
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perspective. However, in § 4 we have been able to link certain initiatory practices to the 
"ascetic instinct", some of which involve submitting to, or inflicting, damage to one's body 
(cutting of a finger, extracting a tooth, circumcision, etc.). There is no reason to doubt that 
such practices were current already in pre-historic times, and indeed, they may conceivably 
have been around long enough to become susceptible to selection pressure. However, if the 
argument presented in this paper is correct, the "ascetic instinct" could not be selected away 
separately, there being no genetic package involving it and nothing else. The "ascetic 
instinct" may indeed have slightly reduced the survival chances of its bearers, but this slight 
reduction was more than offset by the increased survival chances connected to the use of 
language. As we have seen, there are good reasons to think that "ascetic instinct" and 
language are inseparably connected, that they may even be two sides of the same coin. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
It would be wildly optimistic to think that the preceding pages have finally solved "the 
problem of asceticism". They have, to be sure, brought to light a common theme that 
manifests itself in many forms of asceticism as well as in other practices, such as initiations, 
and in certain wide-spread popular as well as philosophical notions about the nature of the 
soul and of spiritual beings. But many steps separate the predisposition shared by all to 
consider oneself different from body and mind, from the decision taken by some few 
determined individuals to actually stop taking care of their body, or to face the most 
extreme of circumstances (including torture) in indifference. Those steps need to be 
explored, but that task cannot be undertaken in the present study. 
 What has been gained, I believe, is the basis for "a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for the comparative study of asceticism", mentioned as a desideratum at the 
beginning of this study. It is henceforth possible to determine the extent to which different 
forms of asceticism belonging to different cultures are expressive of the shared human 
predisposition here identified. Cultural differences can then be studied against the 
background of this common predisposition. 
 Perhaps some insight has also been gained into other aspects of what is commonly 
called religion. Frequently attested ideas about the nature of the (or a) soul have now lost 
their status as curiosities and can take their place within a broader understanding of "human 
nature". We have also come one step nearer an explanation of the wide-spread occurrence 
of ideas about an inactive highest god. Here, however, tantalising problems remain: For 
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example, it remains unclear why symbolic representation should give rise to the idea of an 
inactive highest being. More precisely, it is not clear why the idea of an inactive self should 
be transferred so as to give rise to that of an inactive highest being. There are, as is well 
known, numerous examples of religious beliefs that conceive analogously, or even identify, 
the "essence" of the individual, i.e. the soul, and the "essence" of the universe, i.e. the 
creator or universal spirit. The transfer of properties from one to the other is not, therefore, 
surprising. The difficulty is to understand how and why symbolic representation should 
encourage or even facilitate such a transfer. 
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